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This thesis identifies factors that may induce Japan to create greater military
capabilities and normalize military force as a potential source of national power in its
security policies. A realist theoretical framework for analysis is constructed. It consists
of Great Power Theory, the Law of Comparative Advantage, and the Utility of Military
Force, and dismisses the artificial divisions between levels of analysis. The thesis
examines the failure of Japan's national security doctrine in the post-Cold War world. It
explores the impact of economics, Japan's national goals, security threats, and the US-
Japan alliance on the country's construction and normalization of increased military
capabilities. Japan's primary obstacles to military normalization, Article 9 of its
constitution and domestic opinion, are assessed. The thesis concludes that Japan's
national talents, production capabilities, and status as a maritime nation make it likely
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The purpose of this thesis is to identify factors that may prompt Japan to create
greater military capabilities and to normalize the concept of military force in its national
security policy. It answers two questions. First, will Japan create a more capable
military force in the post-Cold War era? Second, what type of military force will Japan
construct? The thesis analyzes the way in which Japan's Comprehensive Security policy,
economics, the pursuit of "normalcy," security threats, and the US-Japan security alliance
are shaping Japan's military and policy transitions. It will demonstrate that Japan's likely
area of military expansion will be its Maritime Self-Defense Forces. It suggests that the
United States will have a significant impact on the force shaping and force normalization
through its alliance relationship with Japan.
This topic is important for two reasons. First, the United States will be required
to accept Japan as a stronger (but still subordinate) partner in its Asian foreign policy.
Behind the American Cold-War military shield, Japanese foreign policy reflected US
preferences. In the current multi-polar environment, however, serious domestic and
external challenges could force Japan to take actions independent of that alliance's
constraints or privileges. The United States must have an understanding of the dynamics
that are shaping Japanese military and foreign policy decisions. As Japan's only formal
ally, America has considerable influence in its decision making. An appreciation of
Japan's position in twenty-first-century world politics will allow the United States to
XI
guide Japanese decision making to preserve regional stability, maintain America's
leadership role in Asia, and strengthen the US-Japan alliance.
Second, to maintain its stabilizing influence in Asia, the United States must foster
Japanese maritime growth and its overall self-defense capabilities. The provisions of the
US-Japan security agreement require Japan to assume more responsibility for its own
defense to free limited American forces for other actions in Asia. It also requires Japan
to increase its direct support of US military operations. Both provisions demand greater
Japanese maritime capabilities. Domestic resolve to become a "normal state" along with
Japan's embarrassment over its lack of support for American actions in the 1991 Persian
GulfWar will, most likely, compel it to support more forthrightly the requirements of the
US-Japan security agreement.
Chapter I presents an overview of the thesis and four theoretical assumptions used
in following chapters. Chapter II examines factors that may compel Japan to increase its
military capabilities. Japan's Comprehensive Security, domestic economics, Japan's
pursuit of "normalcy," security threats, and the US-Japan security alliance are explored.
Chapter III presents the primary obstacles, Article 9 and domestic opinion, to any
increase in military capability Japan might pursue. Chapter IV examines factors that
continue to focus Japan's military growth toward a maritime force. Chapter V concludes
with a summary of the key issues facing the United States in managing the security
alliance.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Imperatives
The international structure that has developed since the end of the Cold War has
placed new constraints on how states interact and wield their instruments of national
power. Japan, like other countries, will have to decide whether to alter the size and
capabilities of its armed forces, as well as its concepts for the use of military force in
pursuit of its national goals. As Japan moves into the twenty-first century, key internal
and external factors will affect its national security policy. The ineffectiveness of Japan's
Comprehensive Security approach, based on the primacy of economic strength and
foreign aid, in preserving regional stability and gaining international prestige, has
disrupted long-accepted paradigms in Japan's national security thinking (Funabashi,
1998). In addition, Japan's changing economy and demographics may deepen its global
economic commitments raising its overseas business assets and numbers of citizens
abroad. This could bring with it responsibilities for protecting and evacuating those
assets and citizens during political upheavals and natural disasters. These factors, along
with Japan's desire to become a "normal state," are pressures that may result in enhanced
defense force capabilities and an increased willingness to incorporate military force in
Japan's national security policy.
Japan also may be forced to increase its armed forces' power projection
capabilities in response to its growing territorial and psychological insecurities. Evolving
regional threats include the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), the possibility of a unified Korean nation, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), regional territorial disputes, and an Asian arms race. Alliance with
the United States does not fully relieve Japan's anxieties. The United States, as the
primary stabilizing force in the region, might be reluctant to intervene in regional
disputes and to protect Japan's interests. With a regional perception of falling American
prestige, Japan is not completely confident that its superpower ally will always be
available or risk complicated involvement on behalf of Japan's perceived national
interests. America's proper orchestration of the US-Japan alliance is crucial in shaping
Japan's military capabilities and policies.
2. Restrictions
In increasing its military capabilities, Japan must balance its need for a more
capable military with the restrictions of domestic opinion and Article 9 of its "Peace"
constitution. Japanese officials must gain the acquiescence of the Japanese people for an
increase in capabilities. Japan must also decide whether to revise or reinterpret its laws to
allow necessary changes. Because of its war record as an aggressor, Japan also must
consider opposition from other Asian nations in its force posture decisions.
3. Reactions
Japan could respond to these imperatives with a more maritime oriented and role
specific military, which is more technologically advanced, possessing the ability to
project power in the Asia-Pacific region beyond the limited, one thousand-mile corridor
instituted in response to the US-Japan security agreement. Based on the law of
comparative advantage, its economy, national talents, and its sensitivity to ground force
operations, Japan may discover that the increased development and restructuring of its
maritime forces will be the most productive course of action while incurring the least
economic and political costs. Japan's maritime capabilities will probably emphasize
operations other than war (OOTW) and strategic, sea-based defense as well as its current
orientation to guerre de course.
Since Japan is the region's second most capable naval power, after the United
States, this evolution will be a logical choice. A maritime oriented force will maximize
Japan's industrial talents and resources. It has already begun this transformation to a
power projection force with recent commitments to the support requirements outlined in
the 1996 US-Japan security treaty, request for a sea-based Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) system, and the 1997 introduction of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship JDS
Osumi.
4. Consequences
Japan's failure to assume its role as a "great power" and adapt to the imperatives
of the international system could result in its loss of net power, influence and prestige in
world politics (Layne, 1993). Japan must balance its sources of national power to prevent
this loss and achieve its national goals. It needs economic, diplomatic, psychological,
and military power together, in a combined effect, each factor amplifying the other and
compensating for the shortcomings of any one factor (Drew and Snow, 1988). Japan also
may come to recognize that a state's physical strength underlies the credibility of all other
sources of national power. In its evolution toward becoming a complete power, Japan
may realize that military force has utility beyond the battlefield.
5. Cautions
Discussion of and predictions for Japanese military forces require caution.
Japan's behavior from 1868 to 1945, failure to appraise its legacy accurately, and its post-
war pacifism can cause emotions to cloud assessment. Some analysis of Japanese
military capabilities and future trends fluctuates between predictions for unrestrained
militarism to abject pacifism. Article titles reveal this trend toward hyperbole: From
Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism (Berger, 1993); Japan
Ponders Power Projection (Cloughley, 1996); The Once and Future Superpower
(Menon, 1997); and Japan's Military Force: Return of the Samurai? (Halloran, 1996).
Of those that predict a more robust Japanese military, few explore a possible moderate
Japanese approach to security. This thesis suggests that an incremental and force-specific
type of Japanese military growth is likely. No radical changes are foreseen. Japan may
gradually replace the sword at its side for a larger, sharper one, but the blade will remain
in its scabbard.
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The following theories are presented to establish assumptions underlying the
analysis. These theoretical generalizations link the various factors examined providing
boundaries, focus, and direction in exploring Japanese defense alternatives. They are the
lenses through which empirical information is interpreted.
1. The Rise of Great Powers
The anarchic international system contains incentives for states to become great
powers if they are capable. If a state is capable of achieving great power status, and it
fails to do so, it will be punished by the system. (Layne, 1993 : 15).
The principal interest of states is their own survival. In an anarchic system, the
survival of states is in constant danger. Therefore, governments have an abiding and
powerful interest in making their countries more secure. (Waltz, 1979 : 107, 127) If states
cannot garner a sufficient share of security on their own, they will attempt to balance with
another state against their greatest threat. This is a source of alliances. (Walt, 1987 :7-
33) Alliance benefits, however, are not without entanglements. A gain of power in the
international system leads to greater commitments for leadership, greater interests, and
increasingly complex responsibilities in that system. (Kennedy, 1987 :xxiii)
States must adapt to international norms if they are to gain great power status.
They must accept the established paradigms of international interaction to be effective in
the system. (Walt, 1987) When these paradigms shift, states must shift with them or risk
vulnerability. As Japan attempts to secure its place in the new international system, it
must shift the methods with which it wields national power. From 1945 to the end of the
Cold War, Japan emphasized the primacy of economics. It was able to do so because of a
stable, bipolar system in which the efficacy of military force was suppressed by the
disproportionate power held by the Soviet Union and the United States. It also was able
to translate this economic power into military power through its alliance with America.
This paradigm has changed in the post-Cold War world. The new system may require
Japan to increase its military capabilities in the current unipolar system especially as it
evolves to multipolarity.
2. Law of Comparative Advantage: Specialization and Division of Labor
Though the law of comparative advantage, specialization, and division of labor
are three theories normally associated with economics, they can be extended to the realm
of international relations and alliances. Briefly, the law of comparative advantage asserts
that, of all the things a state might try to produce, it can produce one, or a small number
of things most efficiently for the world market. It is to a state's benefit to do this rather
than try to produce everything and be self-sufficient. The validity of this concept is
illustrated by the success of countries that have integrated into the world economy
compared to the failure of autarky as in the DPRK's Juche concept. No state has the
resources, expertise, and capacity to produce all items with the highest quality and at the
best price. If countries employ their resources in creating the items they can efficiently
produce, they can profitably participate in the world economic system. (Samuelson and
Nordhaus, 1985 :833)
Security arrangements are similar. Few states have the capacity to create a robust
military capacity across the full spectrum of land, sea, and air warfare. Depending on a
state's strengths, weaknesses, and liabilities, trying to produce all of these capabilities
may reduce its ability to do any of them well or have consequences in one field that will
negatively impact the others. For instance, states wishing to avoid diplomatic
disadvantages or proliferation of WMD in their region by producing nuclear weapons
may opt to rely on the nuclear protection of a larger power that already possesses such
weapons.
An example of miscalculating comparative advantage is Syria's use of its air force
against the Israeli Air Force in the 1982 clashes over the Beka'a Valley, Lebanon during
Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee. Because the Syrians could not skillfully conduct
air-to-air maneuver combat, they lost over 100 aircraft to proficient Israeli fighter pilots
without shooting down a single enemy warplane. In contrast, Egypt acknowledged its
limitations in air-to-air battle during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It relied on the
combined arms effect of its Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile umbrella to shoot down
50 Israeli planes in the first three days of combat (Herzog, 1998 :31).
Specialization permits each state to produce a product, or in this case a security
function, that exploits its advantages in technology, resources, or national character. In
the earliest economic and security systems people knew the advantage of establishing a
division of labor—better to let the strong fight, the slow fish, and the smart lead.
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985 :54) All existed in a symbiotic relationship. The
precedent for this has already been established in the security arena when the former
Czechoslovakia supplied nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) teams for coalition
forces during the Gulf War. Specialization and division of labor require interdependence
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985 :54). States need others to make up for the systems or
services that they forego in the name of efficiency.
3. The Utility of Military Force
The overwhelming evidence in the post-Cold War era shows that economic
primacy is no substitute for economic primacy backed by force in international relations.
With most of the world now engaged in the free market system, the world might appear
to lack economic borders, but it is not borderless in politics. With the European Union as
an exception, states cling to their sovereignty. With no world government and no
enforceable international rules, states still seek security because they must, or potentially
be left to the ravages of other states that are more aggressive. (Lim, 1999 : 1 12) Japan's
foreign policy, based on economic primacy, is a product of the unique US-Japanese
relationship during the Cold War. In this continuing relationship, America brings an
overwhelming force of arms and a nuclear umbrella. Japan's adherence to this alliance is
a tacit acknowledgement of the utility of force.
Money is not enough to create leverage over other states. Only force or the
credible use of force underlying other policies will achieve reliable results. World
appeasement of Saddam Hussein did not stop his army from invading Kuwait in 1990. It
took force remove Iraq from Kuwait. Diplomacy was ineffective in preventing the 1996
Taiwan Straight Crisis. Two carrier battle groups, however, were effective in deterring
further Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. The United State's sanctions on Iraq in 1998
had to be augmented with Operation Desert Fox, the bombing of key Iraqi targets, to
effect change. States choose security over money (Lim, 1998 : 122).
Japan's use of economics as a substitute for military credibility has failed to
produced concrete political results in the post-Cold War world. Economics could not
stop India or Pakistan from detonating nuclear weapons even though Tokyo promised
economic inducements and sanctions to both countries. (Funabashi, 1998) India and
Pakistan's decisions to detonate nuclear weapons were based on traditional factors of
power, status, and security. (Lim, 1999 :112) Neither could economics influence France
or China to cease their nuclear tests a few years earlier. Poor nations, especially those
that do not subscribe to the free market system, are not deterred by economic threats:
when North Korea launched its Taepodong missile over Japan in August 1998 it hardly
improved its economic prospects. The DPRK derives approximately four billion dollars
of hard currency annually from its surreptitious domination of Japan's pachinko
gambling parlors and its workers in Japan (Bandow, 1996 :129). That is 21 percent of its
$19.3 billion per year revenues (CIA Factbook, 1998). It is willing to risk these
economic gains, however, in its quest for status and power.
4. Levels of Analysis and Their Artificial Divisions
States' actions are shaped by the structure of the international system. States,
however, make unit-level decisions which in turn affect the way the state acts within and
upon that system. This interaction is a feedback loop. (Layne, 1993 :9) Systems in one
level of analysis can have shaping effects on systems, and even units within those
systems, at other levels.
Rigid divisions between levels of political activity inhibits the analysis of the
interrelationship between specific factors which lay in both the international and
domestic level. Kenneth Waltz has posited distinctions between the international,
domestic, and individual levels. (Waltz, 1979 :49) The purpose of these barriers is to
focus analysis on an appropriate sphere of activity. This isolates a set of relationships
from the unpredictable and numerous details that would otherwise distract the analyst
from identifying consistent patterns. This approach, however, does not allow for cause
and effect analysis of a specific set of variables that lay athwart the barriers, a vertical set
which cross-cuts through more than one level.
The barriers between the domestic and international levels need to be eliminated
to see which domestic and international interests correspond with particular strategies of
development (Cumings, 1989 :206). In his study of Chinese foreign policy, Bruce
Cumings noted that as the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is erased, we
can see that for each domestic Chinese development strategy there is a foreign policy
corollary. (Cumings, 1989 :206) Thus, we are led to believe that domestic policy, which
is subject to unit-level actions, has a direct effect on a state's behavior within the
international system. That this behavior is, at the same time, constrained by the
international system has already been established.
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5. Application
The following chapters will analyze factors affecting Japan's transition in the
perception of military force and the alteration of its military to reflect this perception and
domestic, as well as military imperatives based on the aforementioned presumptions.
Chapter II examines factors that may compel Japan to increase its military capabilities.
Japan's Comprehensive Security, domestic economics, Japan's pursuit of "normalcy,"
security threats, and the US-Japan security alliance are explored. Chapter HI presents the
primary obstacles, Article 9 and domestic opinion, to any increase in military capability
Japan might pursue. Chapter IV examines factors that continue to focus Japan's military
growth toward a maritime force. Chapter V concludes with a summary of the key issues
facing the United States in managing the security alliance.
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D. FACTORS OF MILITARY EXPANSION
Men, arms, money, and provisions are the sinews of war, but of these four,
the first two are the most necessary; for men and arms will always find




The Japanese defense establishment and government are going through significant
changes in structure and philosophy. Due to the end of the Cold War, Japan created its
1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO); only the second NDPO in its history.
This plan was designed to reconfigure the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) based on the
change in threat faced by Japan and the change in roles of the SDF. Japan's national
security planners argued that the threat of major war was replaced by a more complex
series of threats. These include regional conflicts, WMD, and international
unpredictability in contrast to the predictability previously ensured by world bipolarity.
Japan also expects the SDF to play a greater role in non-defense areas than in the past.
This includes disaster relief operations and, what it ambiguously titles, "building a more
stable security environment," an indirect reference to greater participation in United
Nations (UN) operations. (Defense of Japan, 1997)
Accordingly, the Japanese are restructuring the SDF with the premises of the
NDPO as a guide. The new emphasis is on replacing quantity with quality, upgrading
capabilities with technology. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has reduced the number
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of SDF personnel and older equipment to prepare for a qualitative upgrade of weapons
systems. The list of new equipment Japan is acquiring is impressive. The SDF is
purchasing additional Aegis destroyers to create an all Aegis fleet; three, flat-deck
amphibious ships to replace aging Landing Ship Tanks (LST); Airborne Warning And
Control (AWAC) aircraft; the F-2 fighter; in-flight refueling capabilities; reconnaissance
satellites; and a TMD system represented by Patriot Ills at present with a planned
upgrade to an Aegis system when developed. (Japan Naval Attache, 1999) The force is
becoming increasingly maritime in nature. Japan has also launched a new central
intelligence organization, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DM), and JDA
Operations Bureau to better its C4I 1 capabilities (Karniol, 1997). Japan's Diet has
recently passed several new initiatives that will provide more freedom of action to SDF
units in self-defense, allow greater cooperation with and support for US Forces, and
allow the SDF more extensive participation in UN operations and OOTW. There is even
a movement to elevate the Defense Agency to ministerial status, a measure unthinkable
just a few years ago. (Klare, 1997)
1. New Actions, Old Paradigms
New force structures, employment concepts, and increased use of the SDF signal
an expanded use of the military in Japanese national security policy and an increase in
Japan's military capabilities. Yet, Japan still remains committed to its Peace constitution.
1 C4I= Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. Integrated system of doctrine,
procedures, organizational structures, facilities, communication computers, and supporting intelligence
assets. (FM 101-5-1)
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Japan is addressing new requirements for the use of military' force de facto but not de
jure. It is creating more capable forces that will be compelled to operate within the same,
pacifist framework it espoused during the Cold War. Its actions may reach a point of
non-compatibility with its ideology. The conflict between Japan's ideology and its
actions will end with either a doctrinally retrenched Japan or a country that exercises
power concomitant with its status as the world's second wealthiest democracy. The
process of change will alter Japan's force structure and its employment concepts further
in an interactive process. Imperatives will create change. Change will create new
imperatives.
2. Underlying Causes Compelling Structural and Policy Revision
Japan appears to be gradually changing its doctrine on the integration of force in
its policies (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993). These changes are responses to the interaction of
domestic and international factors which are discussed in sections B through F (Ezrati,
1997). They are:
a. The obsolescence of Japan's Comprehensive Security policy.
b. Domestic economic transitions.
c. Japan's desire to transition to a "normal" state.
d. The nature of Japan's national security threats.
e. The character ofthe US-Japan alliance.
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These factors are forcing Japan to interact more in the international system with
concomitant responsibilities, obligations, concessions, and costs (Waltz, 1979). As a
result, Japan is beginning to assume the characteristics of other states that have a
powerful economy and a large stake in the international system. 2 The international
system is compelling Japan to balance economics, diplomacy, and psychology with
gradually increasing amounts of military capabilities to wield national power effectively
(Drew and Snow, 1988).
3. Pursuit of National Goals
Japan has a tradition of pragmatic national security policies. It has pursued the
same national goals since 1868, varying its methods and policies according to their
efficacy and the prevailing international norms and parameters of the time.
When the Tokugawa Shogunate was deposed in 1868, Japan established three
national goals: physical security, economic security, and international prestige (Fairbank,
Reischauer, and Craig, 1989). Japan feared foreign exploitation which had emasculated
Imperial China. Its three national goals were designed to guarantee Japan's sovereignty
by insuring its strength. Strength was to be achieved by replicating the West's
technological and military capabilities and then surpassing them. 3 Japan had only
decades to achieve progress the West had gained in a hundred years. It created a strong,
2 Those aspiring to be great powers will compete. Kenneth Waltz states, "Competition produces a
tendency toward sameness of the competitors." (Waltz. 1979 :127)
3 The phrase "catch up and surpass the West" (oitsuki, oikose) epitomized this sentiment (Kazenstein and
Okawara, 1993).
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centralized state, wedded itself to the international economic system, and engaged in
imperialist practices just like its successful Western mentors. (Price, 1946)
Japan's methods proved disastrous in the 1920s. Dependent upon Western
markets and investment, its economy collapsed when the United States turned inward
during the Great Depression. Flexible Japan tried a different approach. It attempted to
create an enclosed economic system in Asia known as the "Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere." When Japan perceived the West was turning against it in competition
for markets and resources, it resorted to militarism to take by force what it could not
retain by political action in the League of Nations. The civilian government lost control
of the Imperial Military through subtle flaws in Japan's governmental system. 4 The
result was an overemphasis on military power to achieve its national goals, confrontation
with the United States, and defeat in the Second World War.
From 1945 to the present, Japan has relied on the primacy of economic strength in
its national security doctrine. The Japanese call this system Comprehensive Security. To
recover and progress in the post-war era, Japan adapted its sources of national power to
the prevailing norms of the Cold War. Like its militarism of the Pacific War era, Japan's
approach, Comprehensive Security, is gradually becoming outdated. If it remains true to
its historical patterns, Japan may again change its national security doctrine to continue
the pursuit of its national goals.
4 The two most significant were the lack of Diet control of the military and the minority veto given the
military by requiring that it approve of the cabinet before a government could be formed. (Fairbank.
Reischauer. and Craig 1989)
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B. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: JAPAN'S OUTDATED DOCTRINE
1. Origins
The origins of Japan's Comprehensive Security date to the founding of the post-
war state. On 8 September 1951 Japan signed its peace treaty with the United States
officially ending the Second World War. In what was called the "Yoshida Doctrine"
after Japan's first post-war Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, Japan gained the privilege
of pursuing economic growth under the protection of America's armed forces while being
required to maintain a small military force under the alliance. During most of Japan's
post-war history, it has only spent about one percent of its Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) on defense per year. Japan prospered under American protection. Accordingly it
pursued limited foreign relations and an isolationist approach to world political affairs.
The Yoshida Doctrine evolved from the "protection of the economy" to the
"primacy of the economy" in Japan's limited foreign relations. Comprehensive Security
was first articulated by the Japanese government as the basis for its national security
policy in the late 1970s (Ball, 1993 :60). The Japanese Defense Agency defined it as
follows:
Efforts in non-military as well as military terms have generally become
very important to ensure national security today. Promotion of diplomacy
for peaceful purposes and measures to ensure the supply of energy and
food are all indispensable for the existence of a country. In order to
achieve national security, it is necessary to incorporate every measure,
both military and non-military in a comprehensive and coordinated way.
(JDAinBall, 1993 :60)
18
This statement appears similar to most nations' security policy except that the
Japanese base theirs on a doctrine of pacifism derived from the legal interpretation of
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. This interpretation prevents Japan from using
military force in its foreign policy. Thus, "military measures" are removed from Japan's
foreign policy process leaving economics to compensate for them.
Political scientists disagree over the efficacy of Comprehensive Security. Neo-
liberals believe that Japan is on the cutting edge of a new norm for international relations.
Peter Polomka, writing in the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, typifies those who
suggest there has been a paradigm shift, that new and more powerful factors have
supplanted the efficacy of force in international relations. He writes:
Science's new paradigm should be persuading statesmen and their advisers
not only that the world will not return to the European-style balance-of-
power politics of the past, but also that even the most powerful states are
destined increasingly to become in different ways "incomplete powers."
.
.
Realism's nineteenth-century "normal state" is a relic of the past. The
emergence ofthe European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) testify to that reality. (Polomka, 1998 : 183)
Neo-realists say Comprehensive Security clashes with Japan's otherwise realist
disposition. Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels have synthesized Japan's emphasis
on economics with a structural realist framework, labeling the resultant hybrid
"mercantile realism." They claim Japan has substituted economic security interests for
traditional definitions of balanced security within a structural realist outlook.
(Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998)
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Definitions of Comprehensive Security are not as important as determining
whether the system works and will continue to work within the new paradigm of the post-
Cold War. Is economic primacy a sufficiently controllable and reliable basis for Japan's
national security? Will economics alone provide leverage over other countries to yield
political gains? We can reasonably expect Japan to alter its Comprehensive Security
doctrine if it is ineffective.
2. Kinken Gaiko
Military protection and foreign policy leadership by the United States during the
Cold War era not only allowed Japan the luxury of focusing its efforts toward economic
primacy in its foreign policy, it prevented Japan from using any other method. (Fairbank,
Reischauer, and Craig, 1989) With military and diplomatic facets of its national power
suppressed, Japan emphasized economics to compensate. Japan's national security
became weighted in favor of economics. The diplomacy and foreign policy that the
country did exercise primarily focussed on improving its economy. The primacy of
making money evolved into using money in the exercise of Japan's policies since the
country lacked a doctrine for the credible use of force. Japan's critics have labeled this
type of diplomacy kinken gaiko, or money diplomacy (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993). It is the
central mechanism of Japan's Comprehensive Security doctrine.
The Japanese government views foreign aid as a primary component of kinken
gaiko. It has sought to conduct foreign policy with monetary inducements and to
substitute these inducements for military strength. As a founding member of the
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Development Assistance Committee in 1961, Japan is the largest foreign aid donor in the
world. Between 1991 and 1996 Japan spent over 70 billion dollars in net disbursements
to the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) fund. (Hunsberger, 1997 :92).
Monetary aid was one of the first items Japan withheld from India and Pakistan when
both nations refused to comply with Japanese demands to cease nuclear testing. The
India/Pakistan case is but one that illustrates how money has little effect in persuading
states to acquiesce to the will of another state. (Lim, 1998) In his case studies on the
effectiveness of foreign aid as diplomatic leverage, Stephen Walt has shown that it plays
a minor and ineffective role in alliances. "It [foreign aid] encourages favorable
perceptions of the donor, but it provides the patron with effective leverage only under
rather rare circumstances." (Walt, 1987:45)
The Japanese have used the ODA to buy national security within the US-Japan
alliance. They have made these donations to compensate for a lack of military
contributions to the alliance. With US collusion, Japan has used ODA funds in a failed
attempt to increase stability in areas of mutual interest to America and Japan. (Keddell,
1993) Japan also has unsuccessfully used large amounts of ODA, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and World Bank support for third world countries, especially African states
who make up the largest third world membership, to garner support for its national goals
such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. (Tamamoto in Hunsberger, 1997
:10) Numerous upheavals in Africa since the end of the Cold War along with Japan's
failure to gain a permanent seat, or maintain its temporary seat on the UN Security
Council illustrate the failure of this approach. Ineffectiveness in the Third World,
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coupled with the ignominy of kinken gaiko revealed after the Gulf War, have rendered
Japan's money diplomacy and its ODA efforts obsolete and disreputable (Fukuyama and
Oh, 1993 and Lim, 1998).
Many critics see kinken gaiko as an extension of Japan's corrupt kinken seiji, or
money politics (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :17). Of note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) is the primary controlling agency of both ODA funds and UN diplomatic efforts
(Kei in Hunsberger, 1997 :93 and Drifte, 1999 :89). The MOFA, Ministries of Finance
(MOF) and International Trade and Industry (MITI) are the principal agencies which
formulate Japanese security policy, with MOFA playing the leading role (Katzenstein and
Okawara, 1993). But the ODA is not merely a foreign policy tool of the government.
The role of Japanese business in ODA direction and in tying grants and aid to purchases
from Japanese companies makes ODA a key link between kinken gaiko and kinken seiji
(Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993). Japan's critics are right.
3. Economics - An Unstable Basis for Security
Japan's economic crisis has demonstrated that the basis of Japan's security,
economic primacy, is unreliable because economies are both unpredictable and
uncontrollable. Japan cannot defend its national interests with economics because it
cannot reliably control its economic situation. In most democracies, the armed forces, a
primary basis for national security, answers to the commands of its government. The
government exerts positive control over the military's size, weapon procurement, and
combat power. Adam Smith correctly postulated that economies are too complex to be
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successfully directed by governments (Kober, 1995). As collapsed Communist countries
discovered in the early 1990s, a state's economic system answers to thousands of
enigmatic forces that can never be adequately and predictably controlled or manipulated
(Kober, 1995). Military power, in contrast, can still be viable even after economic
collapse. Though the Soviet Union disintegrated primarily due to economic inviability,
no one doubted that Russia's military remained a potent force in the world. Even in
1999, though Russia remains in financial turmoil, America has carefully weighed
Moscow's potential military response in the Kosovo conflict.
Though overwhelming evidence suggests that policies backed by the potential use
of military force are more potent than policies not based on a nation's credible use of
force, some academics argue that neither military forces nor economics can guarantee a
state's national security. 5 The outcomes when employing either, they assert, are often
beyond the control of governments (Wirtz, 1999). Military forces may not guarantee a
state's security, but unlike economic inducements, their efficacy is not left to be decided
solely by the adversary. Initiative is not entirely surrendered to the opponent. Executor
control over and input into events is diminished with economic inducements alone. It is
greater when military force is added to policy formulation. A state's ability to positively
and concretely influence its mechanisms of national security provides a measure of
security in itself. This may only be a psychological panacea, but security is relative. It is
a matter of perspective.
See the theoretical assumptions on the utility of military force in Chapter I.
One of the measures of whether a state is secure is the perception among its
citizens of whether they feel secure or not. What makes voters sleep well at night or
protest to their political representatives is the perception of having or not having security.
Recent episodes such as the Japanese hostage crisis in Peru, North Korea's Taepodong
missile firing over Japan, and Japan's lack of influence over Pakistan and India have
made Japanese citizens feel both insecure and impotent (Kirk, 1998 and Nakasone,
1998). Loss of economic prosperity due to the Asian economic crisis is exacerbating the
feeling that security is being lost. (Dibb, Hale, and Prince, 1998) The relationship
between economics and security has been shaken by these events which the Japanese see
as proof of a lack of security.
Comprehensive Security's economic principles transfer the execution of foreign
policy to corporations creating a loss of control by the government. Allowing businesses
to conduct Japan's foreign policy removes the amount of central control necessary for the
Japanese government to execute coordinated policy decisions based on long-term goals.
Corporations are notoriously short-sighted in their outlook. Moreover, their objective is
profit, not security. They will inevitably make decisions that ignore the long-term goals
of the state in favor of their profitability. 6
Japan's decentralized, business-centered security is no longer acceptable in the
post-Cold War era because competition for the rewards of the international system has
increased with the release of superpower tensions. This has made it more difficult for
6 Taiwan is an example of how business interests can be counter-productive to state goals. The Taiwanese
government's policy of distancing itself from the PRC is undermined by increasing Taiwanese business ties
to China (Roy. 1999).
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any one state to garner an effectively large share of power in the system. Superpower
competition overwhelmed and suppressed competition by lesser states during the Cold
War. Smaller countries fell into one or the other superpower spheres of influence and
control. Their efficacy and potential threat were evaluated in relation to how they added
or subtracted to the US or Soviet power. The end of the Cold War increased the number
of competitors, threats, and the complexity of national security for all states. In the post-
Cold War world, states must contest with a larger number of self-serving competitors for
power and security. Because power and security are relative commodities, the margins
for success against a greater number of competitors are less tolerant than before. States
that have unified policies, long-term goals, and can focus their sources of national power
toward achieving those goals will succeed over states that lack control over their national
security doctrines and have incomplete sources of national power.
Comprehensive Security is increasingly a disreputable and ineffective policy for
Japan (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 and Lim, 1998). International conditions have changed
since 1991 that prevent Japan from translating its economic power via US military
strength, into complete national power to the extent that it did during the Cold War.
Kinken gaiko damages Japan's international standing by rendering it an unreliable ally
and partner. It is increasingly failing to produce concrete results reliably in the post-Cold
War world as events in India, Pakistan and Africa have shown. Its assumptions about the
primacy of money have been castigated as an acceptable norm for international relations.
It has demonstrated that its core methods, the giving and taking of money, are less of a
concern to other nations than military security. (Lim, 1998) Finally, it is increasingly
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undermined by forces outside the control of the government making it an unreliable
doctrine. Japan appears to be increasingly compelled to seek a balance in its elements of
national power by increasing its capabilities for armed force, the element most atrophied
in its national security doctrine.
C. DOMESTIC ECONOMICS
Domestic economic factors will likely contribute to a growth of Japanese military
capabilities in that country's pursuit of national security. The financial crisis in Japan,
coupled with US pressure for financial reform, could significantly lessen Japanese
government and corporate collusion thereby diminishing the government's ability to
impact economic security. Concurrently, severe demographic shifts threaten to push
Japanese corporate and industrial assets overseas in search of economically viable means
for vital export production. As the second largest democracy, Japan's interests are world-
wide. Japan's economic evolution may cause its global interests to become even greater
with a corresponding increase in its responsibilities to provide security for growing
number of assets and citizens overseas.
1. Crony Capitalism and Technoeconomic Security
Corporations in Japan enjoy close economic and political collaboration with the
government. This collaboration, or "crony capitalism," is the primary way that the
Japanese government attempts to influence economics and thereby influence national
security. Under this system, corporate viability is not solely subject to the controls that
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profitability establishes. The state maintains an unprecedented level of input into the
country's economic base. (Kober, 1995) Government-business collusion, a remnant of
the Meiji era, has superceded stockholder input to and regulation of Japanese business.
Shareholder leverage is almost non-existent. Unlike American corporations, which
generate 80 percent of their capital from shareholder investments and 20 percent from
banks, Japanese businesses generate only about 20 percent of their capital from
shareholders. About 80 percent of their capital comes from government guaranteed bank
loans. (MOF, 1999) The government also grants businesses "discretionary funds" from
ready cash reserves provided by Japan's high domestic savings rate and other sources
under the government's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FELP). 7 (MOF, 1999) By
guaranteeing capital, the Japanese government removes incentives for its corporations to
structure themselves for efficiency and profitability. In the United States, if a company is
unprofitable due to inefficiency, stockholders will desert it leaving the company without
its primary source of capital.
Japan's emphasis on "technoeconomic" security and life-time employment means
that each of its corporations is a vital contributor to the country's national security.
Technology, on which Japan relies to make up for its lack of other resources, is a
strategic asset. (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998 : 171, 195) The Japanese equate the
loss of a corporation to the loss of national security and stability. In Japan's under-
developed social security system, employment is a source of domestic and political
7 Known as the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FELP). this fund is generated from postal savings
(45%). pension funds (25%). postal life insurance (16%), government bonds and loans (7%). investment
dividends (2%). and miscellaneous (5%). The 1998 FILP fund was $496.2 billion. (MOF. 1999)
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stability. Money is, therefore, guaranteed by the government to prevent bankruptcy and
high rates of unemployment. All governments protect their vital industries as the US
bailout of the Chrysler Corporation in the 1980s demonstrated. In Japan, individual
companies represent a larger fraction of the country's total industry and, therefor, a larger
fraction of its state security. (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998)
The Asian economic crisis and pressure for financial reform may diminish the
Japanese government's tenuous input to its economic security through crony capitalism.
Free-market constraints, which demand profits, could weaken the ties between Japanese
businesses and the country's political parties including the leading decision making body
in Japan: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Olsen, 1999). The LDP has dominated
Japanese government with few interludes since 1955. Conservative in nature, it is a party
comprised of factional committees, most of which are financed and influenced by
corporate sponsors, notably, Japan's large conglomerates or keiretsu. Businesses provide
bribes and faction funds in exchange for guaranteed bank loans, insider access to contract
biding, and protectionist trade policies. (Schlesinger, 1997) This system provides the key
ties between government and business (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :17). Japan's financial
institutions will be forced into more transparent methods of operation where corporate
profitability determines viability. Reform could prompt Japanese corporations to seek
foreign locations for cheaper production if forced to become more profitable. Japanese
labor, equipment, and land are expensive. To stay competitive, Japanese business may
have to look outside the country for investment and manufacturing opportunities. This
would increase Japan's overseas business presence.
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Japanese government recalcitrance in economic restructuring could erode a
significant amount of its national surplus. At present, Japan is attempting to maintain its
current economic practices with interest free bank loans for insolvent businesses and
government subsidies to corporations that defer layoffs. (Los Angeles Times, 1999).
Official unemployment is at four percent (MOF, 1999). Real unemployment, which
could conceivably materialize when government subsidies end, may be as high as 25
percent (New York Times, 1999). Restructuring seems inevitable. Japan's Ministry of
Finance has called for a restructuring of the FJJLP system to remove it from corporate
collusion. (MOF, 1999)
The reduction ofgovernment and corporate collaboration could weaken the state's
mechanisms that influence domestic economics as a means of national security.
Government leaders would then be forced to look to traditional, realist sources for
national security. Increased military capabilities will likely be a tempting choice.
2. Japan's Demographic Shift
Japan's demographic shift toward an older population threatens to erode part of
the state's prosperity. Japan has the fastest aging population in the world. This "silver
society" is a product of the nation's high life expectancy, the longest in the world,
coupled with one of the lowest population growth rates. 8 According to Japan's Ministry
of Health and Welfare (MHW), by the year 2002 the country will have a population
8 Life expectancy^ 80.45 years; Population growth rate= 0.23%: (Birth rate= 1.00%: Death rate= 0.74%:
Net migration rate= -0.037%) (CIA World Factbook. 1998).
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profile similar to the State of Florida's (Ezrati, 1997). If current trends continue, Japan's
work force will peak in 2007 at around 68.6 million out of 129 million citizens and
thereafter decrease. By 2010, over 20 percent of the Japanese population will be over 65
years old compared with 8 percent in China, 9 percent in South Korea, and 13 percent in
the United States (Thompson, 1999). If predictions are correct, there will be
approximately two workers supporting one resource consuming retired person who does
not contribute to the nation's GDP. In addition, Japan's limited work force will continue
to grow older. The MHW has established the Council on Population Problems in an
attempt to remedy this situation. Thus far, it has determined that the reasons for Japan's
population decrease are rooted in cultural and economic factors (MHW, 1999). They are
unlikely to be solved soon.
This demographic shift threatens to erode much of Japan's economic surplus,
decrease standards of living, and reduce the state's available capital. Demographic
impacts could lead to heavier burdens on an increasingly older labor pool, a decline in the
growth of income, increased taxation for a burgeoning social welfare system, dwindling
savings rates, and a declining national surplus which may be steadily eroded to offset
Japan's negative economic growth. Workers would then be in greater demand. Though
actual wages may rise, people would be forced to work harder while enduring a possible
18 percent decrease in the standard of living. (MHW, 1999 and Ezrati, 1997) These
trends could cause a declining work force to cut its savings rate by half of Japan's
traditional 12 to 15 percent of income. This would reduce the Japanese government's
primary source of FILP funds. A decrease in available capital might impact Japan's
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ability to finance its export production which pays for the importation of vital raw
materials, energy sources, and food. Unable to do without imports, the country would be
forced to continue with them despite a shortage of capital. Japan could conceivably incur
a trade deficit, the hallmark of first world industrialized nations. (Ezrati, 1997 :98) Older
people are more likely to vote. They will likely do so to ensure that government
expenditures cover or increase their social welfare benefits. They will have the numbers
to make this happen. (Thompson, 1999)
3. Japan's Overseas Industrial Shift
If the labor pool decreases past a certain point, Japanese businesses may increase
their overseas holdings in an effort to retain ownership of the means of production
(Ezrati, 1997). Technonationalism and the fear of a "hollowing out" of the Japanese
economy will motivate this tendency (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998). This would
likely transform Japan from a mercantile to a headquarters economy where corporations
operate networks of industrial facilities from nerve centers in Tokyo and Osaka
(Hunsberger, 1997 :217). A shortage of labor along with increased labor demand dictates
wage increases. Combined with the increased expenditures that economic viability
measures could bring, this would induce more Japanese corporations to establish
manufacturing facilities in the less developed countries of Asia, Latin America, and
potentially Africa where labor and manufacturing costs are cheaper (Ezrati, 1997 :99)
The shift overseas is well underway. Japanese overseas facility investments in
1996 were $900 billion, a 50 percent increase in five years. Major cities in Manchuria,
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Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Asian nations contain growing numbers of
Japanese manufacturing facilities. (Ezrati, 1997) Many overseas factories now forgo
transshipment through Japan, exporting their products directly to other countries. The
relocation of a portion of Japan's industrial base abroad along with increased import
reliance has reduced the country's trade surplus from $141 billion in 1993 to $84 billion
in 1996. Some economists predict that Japan could have a trade deficit as early as 2002.
(Keidanren, 1998 and Ezrati, 1997 :99)
4. Consequences of a World-Wide Presence
An increased overseas Japanese presence and greater dependence on foreign
locations for manufacturing could create two factors that would give impetus to Japan
developing an increased military capability. First, where Japanese businesses go, so will
Japan's citizens. Already found in large numbers throughout Europe, North and South
America, they could become even more prodigious in less stable regions which meet
Japanese corporate requirements for cheap labor and rising consumerism. 9
Second, like most industrialized nations, Japan could see its global interests and
citizens increase from their present levels. With foreign governmental ties, increased
international production assets, and an increase in bilateral dependencies necessary for its
economic interests, Japan might have to react to distant dangers that it can now afford to
ignore. (Ezrati, 1997 and Defense of Japan, 1998 :66) With world-wide interests and a
global presence comes the obligation to evacuate one's nationals from countries which
9 As of 1996. 763.977 Japanese reside overseas (Keidanren, 1998).
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become unstable due to revolutions, wars, and natural disasters. Japan would likely be
compelled to develop more extensive military capabilities to conduct Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations (NEOs). America alone has conducted or deployed for seven
NEOs in the last two years. 10 The Japanese people will not likely tolerate seeing their
citizens and businessmen trapped and killed in foreign disasters. Japanese national
security policy could be forced to react to these events with a more robust, deployable
military force. Even though these policies seem to contradict present Japanese instincts,
no state, including Japan, can afford to locate its people and productions facilities abroad
and not develop the capability to at least threaten to project power to protect those
citizens and sources of wealth. (Ezrati, 1997 : 101)
5. Solutions Within the Current System
No one is predicting the setting of Japan's sun. Japan may continue to pursue its
national goal of economic prosperity while easing its way into transition. Japan could
reduce, but not eliminate, its economic difficulties by carrying through with its proposed
restructuring of the FELP system. This would free several hundred billion dollars for
other uses besides corporate support, though the concomitant drop in employment would
severely affect Japanese savings rate, which provides 45 percent of FILP money (MOF,
1999). Japan also could reduce its multi-layered, superfluous goods distribution system
10 Monrovia. Liberia; Central African Republic; Tirana. Albania; Phnom Pea Cambodia; Kinshasa. Zaire;
Freetown. Sierra Leone; and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia.
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that supports "Japanese Socialism." 11 This system is one way the Japanese create jobs
for their large population, passing the increased costs to consumers. This excess "fat"
gives the Japanese some elasticity in responding to upcoming labor shortages.
Japan might consider increasing immigrant labor to offset projected shortages and
work in sectors increasingly rejected by Japan's workers. This could allow Japanese
industry to keep more assets at home and preclude having to protect interests abroad.
Japan's younger generation, products of a prosperous society, are becoming averse to the
"3Ks" {Kitanai, Kiken, and Kitsui) or dirty, dangerous, and demanding jobs (Van Arsdol,
1999). While Japan's population may decrease, that of its Asian neighbors will continue
to increase at exponential rates providing a ready pool of labor. As of 1993, there were
approximately 400,000 legal and illegal workers in Japan, many employed in the 3K
sectors of work. (Van Arsdol, 1 999)
Importing labor is unlikely due to the country's ethnocentric outlook and
reluctance to assimilate foreigners. Most Asian nations, especially Japan, determine
citizenship based on race and ethnicity. This ethnocentrism often manifests itself in
xenophobia. Japan, proud of its unique culture, stands out among Asian nations for the
intensity of its discrimination. While immigrant labor might not claim to want a
permanent home in Japan, the country's past experiences with Vietnamese refugees,
11
"Japanese Socialism" refers to the numerous middlemen that exist between manufacturers and
consumers. This system provides jobs in a finite employment market. Each layer adds its few percentage
points to the price of goods, creating high prices for buyers. It is also part of the reason, along with Japan's
service oriented culture, that seemingly hundreds of sales representatives mob arriving department store
guests and roam aimlessly throughout stores seeking the odd buyer needing help. Japanese people may
soon learn to operate their own elevators and pump their own gas as employment generating laws are
changed. (Seward. 1971)
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which were turned away, indicates that it does not want large numbers of foreigners
settling in the country. They are a continual source of friction for a country that prides
itself on homogeneity.
Japan has no cultural mechanism, such as Islam in Arabic states or Catholicism in
France, for assimilating peoples of other races or cultures (Olsen, 1999). Some 800,000
people of Korean descent, including illegal aliens as well as third and fourth generation
Japanese citizens, experience discrimination. Elected Japanese officials are unlikely to
repeal rigorous Japanese immigration and labor laws (Van Arsdol, 1999).
Japan's economic trends will likely cause a greater reliance on more traditional
sources of national power to compensate for its decreasing economic potency in the
world system. As states value power relative to others, Japan will be loath to allow its
aggregate strength to fall. Japan's leaders will likely search for a stable element to ensure
the security of its livelihood. It will increasingly find that military forces ideally fit this
requirement.
D. THE QUEST FOR NORMALCY
Japan's desire to be a "normal country" is often cited as a primary reason it seeks
a more capable military (Drifte, 1998). Japan's drive for normalcy is motivated by
cultural biases and its desire for prominence, influence, and leadership in the international
community. It aspires to be a great nation. To do this, the Japanese believe they need a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This will require Japan to develop an
expanded military capability that can fully participate in UN military operations.
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1. Japanese Views of Normalcy
Waltz's "sameness" effect is not the only factor prompting Japan's evolution
toward normalcy (Waltz, 1979 : 127). Two cultural reasons underlie Japanese desires to
be seen equal to other great powers in the world. First, "normalcy" is commensurate with
equality in Japanese thinking. The Japanese have a national propensity for feeling
victimized and are sensitive to implications of inequality. 12 This has been exacerbated by
Western racism and condescension toward Asians in the past. Since 1868, Japan has
geared its national policy toward erasing Western images of agrarian inferiority and pre-
modern backwardness. Its measures included adopting institutions and behavior which
conformed to Western expectations for "civilized countries" such as democracy and
international participation. Japan abandoned solidarity with Asia to pursue Western-style
military and economic competition. Its participation alongside Western nations in the
1900 Boxer Rebellion, the only Asian nation to do so, exemplified this. Japan is
periodically reminded that the West once viewed it as an inferior nation. American and
Australian anti-immigration laws, aimed at Japanese during the 1920s, infuriated and
humiliated Japan. Now that it has bested many of its Western progenitors in the late
twentieth century, Japan wants no trace of its previous status to remain.
Second, "groupism" lends a cultural bias for Japan to be like other states. In
Japan, the ideas and norms of the group hold primacy over those of the individual.
People, and by inference countries, are forced to assimilate or face ostracism.
12 This desire derives from a unique emotional quality called amae; a word that has no English equivalent.
It is. roughly, the act of seeking emotional succor from others. When this is denied, resentment frustration,
and feelings of loss, all common to victims, are experienced. (Doi. 1981)
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"Groupism" is a unique blend of Confucian subservience to family, nation, and harmony;
samurai ideals of loyalty and duty to superiors found in bushido, Shinto concepts of the
national family; and Tokugawa practices of group liability, go-nin gumi, used for over
two hundred years to maintain order (Ratti and Westbrook, 1973). 13 Being part of a
group structure is a powerful theme. To be excluded from the group is to lack legitimacy.
The Japanese have a saying that illustrates the value placed on conformity: "The nail that
sticks out, is knocked on the head." (Morris, 1975) This desire to conform influences
Japan's desire to be a full member of the sanctioned international community.
2. The United Nations as a Means for Normalcy
Japan has linked its legitimacy in the modern world to membership in the UN.
When the League of Nations refused to recognize Japan's attempt to create an enclosed
order in 1931, militant elements in the Japanese government forced Japan's withdrawal
from the world system. 14 It did not fare well as a pariah state and wished to wash away
that stain by zealously supporting the international community after the Second World
War. Japan viewed its 1956 entry into the UN as another chance to prove itself a
" Go-nin gumi, or five-person groups, were used during the Tokugawa Shogunate era (1600-1868) to
maintain order amongst peasant and merchant classes. If one member of the group got into trouble, all five
were punished. This reinforced already existing ideas of group cohesion found in Confucianism and
bushido. Though China and Korea used this system during various historical periods, it was most
influential in Japan.
14 This was precipitated by the League's refusal to recognize Japan's puppet state of Manchukoku
{Manchukuo or Manchuria) as a sovereign nation. Japan thought it could fare better with a closed
economic system based on exclusive resource rights in Korea and Manchuria than it could under sanctions
from a world which failed to recognize its sphere of influence. United opposition arose when it attempted
to expand this sphere into all of Asia at the expense of colonial and indigenous governments, as the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
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responsible nation. In their first White Paper, published in 1957, the Japanese
government listed "UN centrism" first among its three pillars of foreign policy. 15 Japan
has used the UN to promote its "unsophisticated pacifism" (soboku na heiwa shugi) and
world friendly ethos to make dealing with it more palatable for nations offended by its
Second World War conduct. (Drifte, 1998)
Japan had other realist goals in joining the UN: a desire for full independence
from occupation; an opportunity to strip the UN Charter of the "enemy clauses;" and an
opportunity to break the monopoly of power exercised by the original charter members.
Japanese citizens favored entry into the UN. They hoped that this body might one day
assume responsibility for Japan's defense from the unpopular security alliance with the
United States. This stipulation was included in the 1951 peace treaty on Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru's insistence. (Drifte, 1998) The Japanese government's ambiguous
stance on Charter revision was an effective domestic consensus builder during the chaotic
post-war years. Unanimity was easily garnered due to all factions' desire to remove the
"enemy clauses" of the UN Charter (Articles 53, 77, and 107) which permit actions
without UN approval against any country that was an enemy of any Charter signatory
nation during the Second World War. These gave the Charter members a level of
prestige not open to Japan. Along with most Third World countries, Japan favored
revising clauses which limited permanent Security Council membership to the three
victors of World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, plus
15 The other two were cooperation with the free democratic world and membership of Asia (Drifte,
1998). All three of these exemplify Japan's desire for group membership and acceptance, as well as the
importance which they place on UN membership.
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China and France. Much dissatisfaction still reigns in the General Assembly over this
group's monopoly of power in policy decisions. In an attempt to achieve parity with
other great powers, Japan first expressed its goal of a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council in 1969. The Japanese still support revising the UN as they did in the 1950s.
(Drifte, 1998 :98)
While membership in the UN might bring Japan legitimacy, it does not bring it
normalcy. Incompatibility between UN Charter Article 43, which requires member
nations to supply armed forces for collective security duties, and Article 9 of Japan's
Peace constitution were ignored by both the Diet and the UN upon Japan's entry.
Consequently, Japan does not provide combat forces for potentially dangerous or
combatant duty with the UN. (Drifte, 1998 :98)
3. Japan's Money Diplomacy and the Loss of Prestige
Japan desires a permanent seat on the Security Council because it views this as
the most powerful and prestigious decision-making body in the world. Real power,
including the veto, and status comes with being a member of the elite Permanent Five.
(Drifte, 1998) So far, Japan's reliance on kinken gaiko and its failure to provide military
forces to the UN have hampered this goal. Japan believes it deserves a permanent seat
because of its large financial contributions. It is the second largest contributor to the UN
budget (18 percent, moving to 21 percent in the year 2000) behind the United States.
This is well above Germany's 10 percent, the third largest. Many Japanese are dismayed
that they do not have a voice in how the UN spends their money. Cries of "no taxation
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without representation" are coming from even the most vocal supporters of membership.
(Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :19) This argument is an extension of Japan's customary
reliance on economic means to secure foreign policy goals. Because Japan avoids
military involvement, as well as engagement in controversial issues, kinken gaiko has
generated criticism that it is attempting to buy its seat on the Security Council rather than
contribute with substantive input and policy formulation, evidences of commitment and
leadership (Drifte, 1999 :100). In 1994 a senior Japanese diplomat confirmed the
country's commitment to kinken gaiko when he commented.
The UN question is basically a question of money. We'll be raising our
contribution [to the UN] soon from 12.4 percent to 15 percent, and that
should give us a right of entry. (FEER in Drifte, 1998 : 100)
International disparagement at Japan's failure to aid its ally or the UN with
combat forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War proved that it was unable to achieve
world-class-standing with its wealth (Lim, 1998). The war demonstrated that great
nations banded together to affect world events with force when necessary. The war also
reaffirmed Japanese perceptions that the UN was the organization that played a primary
role in the world's conflagrations. LDP Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro was not able to
override party and public division to pass legislation which would have sent the SDF
overseas in harm's way for the first time since 1945. Eventually citing restraint by
constitutional pacifism, Japan donated $13 billion, $100 per citizen, to the war effort.
The world, as well as many Japanese, saw monetary contributions as the coward's way
out of global security responsibilities (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993). Japan had staked its
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ideology to solid UN support and had failed that organization in one of its most critical
challenges of the post-war era. Japan was derided as unreliable by its only formal ally,
the United States. The international community confronted Japan with the sentiment that
money was no substitute for blood. "In times of military crisis, the banker does not get
nearly as much respect as the soldier." (Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :viii) As a result of this
and other refusals to participate fully in UN combat initiatives, Japan's attempt at gaining
a permanent Security Council seat has been damaged. (Drifte, 1999)
Prestige is a recurring theme found in Japanese motivations. Japan desires a
permanent seat on the Security Council in pursuit of international prestige, its long-
standing national goal. It is in this reason that we find the strongest cultural influences
for equality and alignment with all other great powers, even claims that Japan is superior
due to its status as the world's second largest economic power. Owada Hisashi, former
Vice Minister in MOFA stated his belief that Japan should become more active in
peacekeeping.
The choices of Japan for a course ahead are either whether it wants to
become a "normal" country like Europe and the US, which includes
participation in military activities, or to become a "handicapped country"
that contributes in non-military areas three times more than anticipated.
(Owada in Drifte, 1993)
To the Japanese, "normal" means "to have the same prestige and sources of national
power as Europe and the US." It does not mean "to have the same prestige as China and
India," two countries which also have capable militaries and play a role in the
41
international system but which are seen as inferior by the Japanese. Japan's perceptions
have changed little since 1868 when it entered into the world system on Western terms.
The use of the word "handicapped" illustrates that many Japanese believe that their
country cannot compete equally or gain an equal measure of respect internationally
without military power. Knowing that handicapped people in Japan are often ignored and
left out of society's mainstream gives further insight into Japanese perceptions of being
internationally handicapped.
The Japanese felt further humiliation at their impotence during the 1996 terrorist
takeover of its ambassador's residence in Peru (Nakasone, 1998). Japan's inclination for
using money to avoid conflict, its reluctance to use force abroad, and its ineptitude at
dealing with crisis situations encouraged the Tupac Amaru guerillas to choose Japanese
nationals as their victims. Japanese citizens were critical of their government for its
inaction and its pleas to Peru for a "non-violent" solution. (Economist, 1997) Without
credible, deployable military forces and the political will to employ them, Japan's wealth
will continue to be a target for exploitation by those with no inhibitions to the use of
force. Japan's policies and doctrine will be a critical vulnerability which motivates the
state to pursue more realist military capabilities and doctrine. (Economist, 1997)
Many argue that Japan, as the primary source of regional investment, would be
more representative of Asia in the permanent Security Council than China. The PRC has
little by which to claim great power status besides possession of nuclear weapons. India,
also a nuclear power, will soon surpass it as the most populous Asian nation. The PRC's
future stability is in question as it transitions from socialism to capitalism. China's
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economy is also rated seven times weaker than Japan's. Finally, on the world's Human
Development Index (HDI), China is ranked III th
,
Japan is ranked number three. 16
(Hunsberger, 1997) China was included in the permanent Security Council membership
at the end of the Second World War as a concession to American demands. The PRC,
however, is a UN member in full standing providing numerous military detachments for
peacekeeping missions around the world. Japan is not.
Japan desires a political status and role in world affairs that are equal to its
economic prestige. The primary obstacle to this and its seat on the permanent Security
Council has been the concomitant requirement to make a military contribution beyond
Japan's limited peacekeeping and observation roles allowed under its 1991 Peace
Keeping Operations (PKO) bill. 17 (Drifle, 1998) Japan's reliability as an ally or political
partner is in question. The UN was founded with the intention of eventually maintaining
world peace by force of arms; peace enforcement rather than peace keeping. (Okubo in
Hunsberger, 1997) As world acceptance of the UN has grown, it has incrementally
shifted its operations toward peace enforcement. Japan staked its international prestige
and part of its security on UN membership and participation but failed to anticipate the
costs it would incur to maintain this. Japan also must shift its doctrine if it is to stand
equal among other states and evolve with the international system it covets.
16 Economic level based on 1995 GDP per capita purchasing power parity basis: U.S.= $27,500; Japan=
$21,300; China= $2,900. United Nation's HDI is a quantification and comparison of a nation's health,
education, and economic level. U.S. (#2)- 0.938; Japan (#3)= 0.937; China (#111)= 0.594. (Hunsberger.
1997)
17 The PKO bill limits participation to 2000 SDF troops at a time. These forces must be under UN control
and cannot be committed unless the operations meet a series of stringent guidelines.
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Japan has suggested non-combatant roles that it could fulfill in UN operations in
exchange for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Its offers have not been adequate
to achieve permanent membership. It has proposed supplying all UN operations with
Japanese medical teams or other service support units. (Finn in Hunsberger, 1997) This,
however, does not provide what the UN needs most: well trained, reliable combat forces.
Other, less affluent nations already supply adequate service support forces. This is not a
role commensurate with Japan's international standing and little more than it is currently
doing. The UN desires a sign that Japan is willing to fulfill its commitments under
Article 43. It must be ready to commit blood, not merely treasure, to the full spectrum of
increasingly combat-oriented operations before those on the permanent Security Council,
who are currently doing so, will allow the reluctant nation into its ranks.
With power, prestige, and position come responsibilities. Japan cannot have
international status and its pacifist ideology at the same time. Attempts to buy this
prestige and national security have tended to discredit Japan as a reliable and consistent
state. Substituting money for military effort and risk have brought resentment to Japan
from states with traditional perspectives of national power and prestige. These states will
ultimately decide Japan's worthiness to stand as an equal. Japan desires a permanent
Security Council seat under the auspices of wanting to aid world peace but is unlikely to




Since 1945, the United States has protected Japan's survival and vital national
interests. Several factors may shift much of that responsibility back to Japan: the
perception of US unreliability, regional threats, an Asian arms race, and potential long-
term threats which Japan must prepare for now to be able to deter later. A general
indication of a lack of stability in Asia recently backed up by several threatening events
will convince Japan that it must take responsibility for its own security.
1. The Diverging Interests of the US and Japan
National security theory divides a state's interests into the categories of survival,
vital, major, and peripheral. National survival, the physical existence of a country,
remains a state's core interest. Vital interests are those that will entail serious harm to a
nation if not defended. A state will use force to defend both of these if other means fail.
Major and peripheral interests are those in which a state will exercise a wider variety of
lesser means, such as economic or diplomatic, to defend. Neo-realism recognizes that,
for states to be able to apply lesser means of coercion in their foreign policies, such as
diplomatic pressure, they must have credible forces and effective doctrines for their use.
To directly defend their interests, states must posses a credible deterrence to enemy
aggression. At a minimum, a state must be able to defend itself reliably against an enemy
attack. (Drew and Snow, 1988) One key to determining if Japan will increase its force
capabilities and normalize the conceptual use of force in its national security thinking is
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to determine what Japan's survival and vital national interests are and what the threats to
those interests might be. If Japan perceives a threat to those interests, it will likely
respond with appropriate measures to protect them.
Two prominent categories of Japan's vital interests are natural resources and food.
These are essential to Japan's economy and livelihood. 18 They require regional stability
and the ability of Japan to directly intervene if those are in serious jeopardy. (Funabashi,
1998) Threats to sea lines of communication, access to disputed fishing grounds, and
territorial disputes could interfere with an ensured flow of these resources. Fishing rites
are a major concern in Asia. Japan is the largest harvester and per capita consumer of
fish in the world, the supply ofwhich is rapidly dwindling (Parfit, 1995). Japan competes
with Korea, China, and Russia for scarce fishing areas. Fishing, mineral rites, and
freedom of passage are tied to possession of and access to small islands throughout
Asia's waters. Many, like the Spratly Islands, are submerged most of the year and are
claimed by several nations. Currently, Japan has three territorial disputes: the Senkaku
islands with China and Taiwan; Takeshima island with North and South Korea; and the
Kurile Islands with Russia. All are included in Japan's definition of its national territory
and, thus, are vital interests (Japan Encyclopedia, 1993).
Japan is increasingly uncomfortable in relying heavily on America to defend its
interests, both survival and vital. In the past, Japan has chosen to construct forces and
doctrine to assist America in defending its survival interests leaving defense of its vital
'° Japan's industry is built on one of the world's poorest resource bases. Japan imports: 80 % of all its
energy, 100 % of its petroleum, 100 % bauxite, 100 % iron ore, 100% raw cotton, wool, and rubber. It also
imports roughly 50 % of its food and 33 % of its fish. (Keidanren, 1998 and Japan Encyclopedia. 1993)
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interests solely to the United States. In the post-Cold War world, this relationship is
changing due to perceptions of American efficacy. First, Japan often expresses doubts
about the United States' commitment to maintaining its current levels of commitment in
Asia despite repeated American assurances to the contrary. (Thompson, 1999) The
disappearance of a threat to America's survival interests (e.g., the Soviet Union) coupled
with American troop reductions in the region, causes many Asian states to question US
ling-term commitment. (Kihl, 1994) A 1997 Japanese poll indicated that only 49 percent
of Japanese citizens believe that the United States would assist Japan if it were attacked
(Neilan, 1997).
Second, past US performance leaves a trace of doubt about America's ability to
fight effectively in the close-terrain, manpower, and casualty-intensive environment of
archipelago and mainland Asia. America's warfighting record in Asia since the Second
World War is one loss and one draw. Technology, upon which many claim America is
too heavily dependant, has twice succumbed to less sophisticated, but more tenacious and
casualty intensive, methods of attritional combat still touted by many Asian states
including the PRC (Kuiguan in Pillsbury, 1998). The recent conflict in Kosovo may only
reinforce the inpression that America is over-dependent on technology and reluctant to
engage decisively in ground combat.
Third, Japanese and American security interests have slightly diverged. Interests
that the United States only considers as major, Japan considers to be vital. The United
States is reluctant to interfere in regional, bilateral differences that do not affect the
stability of the entire region. Clearly, America is ready to go to war over Taiwan. It is
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doubtful, however, that America would sacrifice lives for the Kuriles, Takeshima, or the
Senkaku Islands. An indicator of this is that US and Japanese intelligence interests have
become increasingly non-congruent. As a result, Japan's DIH has sought bilateral
relationships with a broader group of partners (Jane's Defense, 1997). Japan also plans to
launch its own reconnaissance satellites to reduce its dependency on America's
intelligence sources and prioritization which it sees as unreliable and not geared to
Japan's needs (Sakoda, 1999).
Fourth, even with an extensive American arsenal present in and around Japan, the
Japanese fear that the United States might not be able to respond to a threat in time to
prevent it (Chai, 1997). Wargames testing the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy and
Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) cooperation against and US
responsiveness to DPRK naval incursions into Japanese waters have concluded that US
forces would be mired in administrative obstructions while the situation culminated
(Economist, 1999).
Last, the physical threats to Japan are increasing, threats that the US-Japan
alliance is not designed to defeat. The US-Japan alliance is a strategic alliance designed
to defend Japan's survival interests. 19 The smaller scale, but important, tactical threats to
Japan are growing. On 18 December 1998, the South Korean Navy destroyed a North
Korean submarine only 30 miles from Japanese waters (Economist, 1999). Similarly, on
23 March 1999, for the first time since the Second World War, Japan dispatched several
JMSDF warships and patrol aircraft to chase two suspected North Korean ships in
19 A survival interest is one that exists when the physical existence of a state is at risk (Nuechterlein, 1985).
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international waters near Japan. Invoking its right to "self-defense," the Japanese ships
fired warning shots in a failed attempt to stop the suspected North Korean vessels which
escaped unscathed (New York Times, 24 March 1999).
This latest incident also demonstrated the shortcomings of Japan's pacifist
national security policies. The JMSDF was not able to stop the hostile craft because the
SDF is prohibited by law from actually firing at suspected threats and from boarding or
inspecting such threats in international waters (Jordan, 1999). The Japanese are worried
that their security policies might not allow adequate defense in the future. "Japan's
security preparations are not enough," said Yamasaki Taku, head of the LDP panel which
debated the recently-passed defense bills allowing greater Japanese cooperation with the
US. (Aoki, 1999) Military security is growing as a Japanese concern.
The following sections detail Chinese, Korean, and Russian threats to Japan's
interest.
2. The China Threat
China represents a long-term threat to Japan. The PRC gives Japan a sufficient
alibi for developing greater military capabilities. First, China's nuclear forces are
increasing in quality and quantity. Second, China has the ability to sow disruption in the
Asia-Pacific region. Last, China's potential military and economic power is the greatest
in the region.
The area in which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) excels is nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles. Japan's involvement in regional security could bring it into conflict
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with this nuclear power. With the surreptitious acquisition of America's most advanced
warhead designs, China possesses a modern nuclear arsenal capable of dominating Japan.
The latest stolen American technology should allow China to produce long-ranged,
multiple-warhead missiles, making TMD systems less effective. (New York Times,
1999) Solid propellants also will make them more responsive, not a desirable quality in
an unstable country. Anywhere from 150 to 200 M-class missiles are deployed against
Taiwan heightening tensions in the region. Japan has relatively close ties with Taiwan
and would likely be involved in a conflict as a United States ally if China attempted to
take the island nation by force. (MSNBC, 1999)
China's likely role in Asia within the next 15 years is that of regional counter-
balancer to American power (Ross, 1997). China claims that it is contained by Japan's
involvement in regional security coupled with America's presence. China's nuclear
power status, along with its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, gives it leverage
in international and regional diplomacy. It will likely attempt to use this power to oppose
regional initiatives by Japan and the United States. China will probably strengthen its
growing ties to Russia and the Middle East, forming a counter to the US-Japan alliance
which it distrusts. The Chinese see the Japanese-American alliance as a shield for future
Japanese military growth, an attempt to contain them, and a license to counter a PRC
invasion of Taiwan. (Ross, 1997)
China increasingly believes that regional alliances are aimed at limiting its power
in Asia. It is responding by increasing its military strength. Japan's attempt to foster a
web of bilateral agreements with the ROK, Russia, the United States, and possibly
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Taiwan has drawn accusations of Japanese imperialism from China. (Stratfor GIU, 1998)
Japan is searching for military security against a Chinese threat. It believes that whatever
measures it takes, either to increase security or maintain the status quo, China will
continue to build its military machine, especially its missile and naval forces (Trilateral
Naval Cooperation, 1997).20
In addition to Japan's concerns about the PRC as a strong, growing neighbor,
China is arguable prone to instability given its type of government and its tumultuous
history. (Thompson, 1999) The PRC could undergo a political and civil upheaval as its
authoritarian government tries to make capitalism and socialism work simultaneously.
Social unrest is at an all-time high in the country and is increasing due to economic
transformation and unpopular government policies. Rising nationalism might spark
disturbances over Taiwan, the Senkakus (Diaoyu islands), and the disputed Spratlys,
where China could exert control over the sea lanes to the Malacca and Lombok Straits. 21
(Shambaugh, 1997) A disturbance in any one of the aforementioned areas could likely
involve Japanese military forces.
It is China's potential that most worries Japan. Its fast growing economy and
technology base threaten to field a more technically advanced and capable military in the
20 China has purchased about a billion dollars of Russian weapons per year since 1994. most of them
aircraft or ships. They are currently purchasing Sovremenny class destroyers designed to defeat Aegis
class ships on which Japan has based its modem fleet. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has
deferred plans for an aircraft carrier until after the year 2000. (Thompson. 1999) Japan's TMD system is
likely to be deployed aboard an Aegis class ship.
21 China's claims to the Senkaku. or Diaoyu islands, dates from the 16th century. As far back as 1830.
Japanese maps acknowledged ownership by China ghing Japan little credibility for its 1884 claim.
(Kristof. 1998)
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near future. China has fiinneled significant military advances from American
universities, private industry, and government resources (Webb, 1999). Its economy
could be the largest in Asia by 2015. It is suspected of building a blue water navy, more
capable nuclear weapons, and a military machine that will return it to its "rightful" place
at the center of Asia. Many of its recently acquired US military secrets could be
incorporated into the PLA within 15 years (Timperlake and Triplett, 1998). Japan is
likely to continue increasing its military capabilities as a response to China's growth.
3. The Korean Threat
Korea represents three security concerns for Japan: an absence of security
cooperation with South Korea; the possibility of a unified Korea hostile to Japan; and a
direct North Korean threat to Japan's physical security.
While South Korea is not a threat to Japan, the lack of effective security
cooperation between the two states is a problem. Japan has numerous reasons for
desiring security cooperation with the ROK: international good will, containment of
DPRK forces, ensuring a friendly unified Korea in the future, and de facto involvement in
ROK security through the US-Japan security agreement. There are four reasons,
however, to explain why Japan-ROK security cooperation has not been more robust.
First, no formal agreements can be signed because Japanese constitutional interpretation
proscribes collective security agreements. Second, Japan fears that China will interpret
closer cooperation as an attempt to contain the PRC.
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The third reason is potentially the most problematic. Koreans have deep-seated
enmity over Japan's colonial rule. This stands in the way of cooperation. In a 1995
survey of Korean attitudes, an amazing 69 percent responded that they "hated" Japan
while only 6 percent said that they "liked" Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 1995). Japan's
emphasis on North Korean as threat has only exacerbated South Korean fears that Japan
will interfere in their sovereignty. Accordingly, the ROK is demonstrating pan-Korean
sentiments. The Director General of the JDA, Nukaga Fukushiro, stated that Japan might
consider preemptive air strikes against North Korean missiles "...rather than just sitting
and waiting for death." (Stratfor, 29 Nov 98) South Korea opposes any Japanese military
actions on Korean soil but has offered no solutions to placate Japan's fears. Japanese
reactions, exacerbated by South Korea's inability to mollify their concerns, could further
South Korea's mistrust of Japan and push Japan to seek an independent military solution
if it feels its highest national interests are in jeopardy.
Enmity between Japan and Korea over their past colonial relationship still
generates mistrust. This mistrust is likely to push both nations to militarily hedge its bets
against the other. Most Koreans are still vitriolic over past Japanese aggression,
especially in the North where hatred of Japan is official policy. The two nations continue
to negotiate sensitive issues such as Takeshima/Tok-to Island and comfort women.22
Neither Korea accepts increased Japanese military strength even under the imperatives of
the US-Japan Security agreement. The ROK has engaged in a defense policy entitled
22
"Comfort women" is a euphemistic term applied to Korean women who served as prostitutes in the
Imperial Japanese military during the Second World War. Most did so against their will.
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"360 degree security" which is aimed at containing Japanese military power (Olsen,
1999) Its military acquisitions are in line with those needed to prosecute a war on Japan
rather than the DPRK. In 1996, the ROK Navy deployed three destroyers in response to
Japan's claim over Takeshima Island (Glain, 1997). Ties between South Korea and
Japan are slowly increasing as a result of Japan giving yet another apology for its
misdeeds to Korea, written down this time in a joint agreement signed on 8 October
1998. Unfortunately, mutual trust is not likely to grow as fast as mistrust between the
two countries. Japan and the South Korea will probably continue to cooperate under the
auspices of the trilateral relationship with the US while each unilaterally builds its forces
for security.
The fourth factor inhibiting close cooperation between Japan and South Korea is
their geostrategic rivalry (Menon, 1997). Japan and South Korea are arguably the two
most dynamic states of North East Asia. Their geographic proximity and similar
economies create friction between the two countries. The SDF believes Korea to be a
potential threat to Japanese security, the traditional "dagger pointed at the heart of
Japan." (Olsen, 1999) In a dynamic not dissimilar from sibling rivalry, both seek the
primary attentions of the United States as a geostrategic partner (Olsen, 1999). In
addition, Japan fears the potency of a unified Korean nation. North Korea's collapse
would create a populous country (approximately 68 million,) with a large armed forces,
very near Japan. (Menon, 1997)
Japan also fears that if Korea unifies it will drift into its traditional Chinese orbit
(Trilateral Naval Cooperation, 1997). Walt, in his balance of threat theory, states that the
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closer a nation is to a traditional threat, the more likely it is to bandwagon (Walt, 1987).
Historically, the rise of Korea has paralleled the rise of China (Kim in Kihl, 1994 :23).
The ROK refutes this possibility. President Kim Dae-Jung has even expressed his desire
for American troops to remain on Korean soil after unification. These political
sentiments could easily change in the wave of Korean nationalism likely to accompany
unification (Olsen, 1999).
The DPRK stands as a clear and present danger to Japan's national security.
North Korea has abducted Japanese citizens from its territory (Jordan, 1999). It also
frequently lands clandestine forces in Japan. The Japanese regularly monitor North
Korean messages to these agents. (New York Times, 1999) North Korea also has
threatened to use WMD against Japan. In a 6 April 1994 interview, the DPRK
Ambassador to India and a former vice foreign minister told South Korea's Yonhap
News Agency that "...our nuclear arms, if developed, would be primarily designed to
contain Japan." (Reuters in Park, 1998 :1 12) North Korea's August 1998 missile launch
served to convert North Korean hyperbole into a credible threat. Japan has used this act
to build domestic support for and rebuff international criticism of acquiring TMD.
However, no missile defense system can protect all 363,000 square kilometers of Japan
from ballistic missiles fired from sites as close as North Korea (Cloughley, 1996 :71). To
be effective, Japan would have to develop a pre-emptive strike capability with aircraft or
cruise missiles; a solution hindered by its constitution.
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4. The Russian Threat
Russia, like China, remains a long-term military threat to Japan and an immediate
threat to the stability of Asia. While its military readiness is currently at low ebb, Russia
intends to continue its position as a major world and regional influence as its intervention
in Kosovo demonstrates. Russians believe they must counter the growing hegemony of
"the West" led by the United States and Japan in Asia. (Stratfor GIU, 1999) Russia
plans to continue development of more powerful intercontinental ballistic nuclear
missiles represented by its latest TOPOL-M design (ROK MND, 1998). It has already
expressed its displeasure for planned Japanese military capability expansion under the
US-Japan security agreement. Russia's position as a Pacific power has always been in
question. Its current insecurities, caused by regional political turmoil and economic
problems, may cause Russians to reassert themselves forcefully in world events.
5. Asia's Arms Race
Russia also threatens stability by exacerbating Asia's arms race. Moscow is a
primary supplier of advanced military weaponry to the region. This flow of weapons,
Chinese irredentism, and the perception of receding American power in the region have
caused a rise in Asian military spending, armed forces capabilities, and domestic arms
manufacturing capabilities. (Johnson, 1997) Based on calculations by the US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, military spending in East Asia has risen from an
average of $126 billion per year in the 1984-1988 time frame to $142 billion annually
from 1992-1994. In 1996, Asians accounted for 48 percent of the world's purchases of
56
large conventional weapons such as aircraft, tanks, and submarines though spending is
currently down due to Asian financial difficulties (SIPRI in Glain, 1997) China's
military spending has increased 12 percent from 1997 to 1998. Sample increases during
the 1984-1994 time frame include: Japan, 41 percent; South Korea, 65 percent, Taiwan,
58 percent; Thailand, 65 percent; and Malaysia, 62 percent. (Klare, 1997)
There are trends in Asia's arms procurement. Generally, military growth in Asia
has been concentrated in its maritime forces (Bracken, 1998). This poses the greatest
threat to maritime Japan. Many Asian countries are converting their coastal navies into
power projection, ocean going forces (Klare, 1997). New capabilities are being added.
Pakistan and India have both become nuclear powers. The Royal Thai Navy has acquired
a Spanish aircraft carrier with Harrier aircraft. Thailand has increasing close ties to
China. It has traditionally survived by bandwagoning with the dominant regional power
(Olsen, 1999). It could conceivably add this capability to China's navy in the future.
The end of the Cold War decreased stability in Asia on levels affecting Japan's
vital and survival interests. The Japanese will likely meet these with increases in their
military capabilities and alterations in their use of force. A greater willingness to use
force may cause a tacit acknowledgement in Japan that military action has a rightful place
the country's national security policies.
F. THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The US-Japan security alliance will be a primary factor in shaping Japan's
emerging military capabilities. It is fitting to apply Lord Palmerston's observation on
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Britain's foreign policy to Japan: "[Japan] has no eternal friends, no eternal enemies,
only eternal interests." Critics disparage the US-Japan alliance as obsolete with the
disappearance ofthe Soviet threat (Hosokawa, 1998). One of the primary purposes of the
alliance, however, is the maintenance of stability in Asia. The end of the Cold War
removed many superpower restraints on East Asia making it one of the least stable
regions in the world (Saito, 1998). The alliance is as relevant as ever. Japan and the
United States will continue to favor the US-Japan alliance because of their common
interest in regional stability, common threat perceptions, and because the partnership has
been validated as a stabilizing factor in Asia since 1945 (Saito, 1998). The alliance also
conforms to the modern trends of Japanese alliances. Japan will continue to support it
because the alliance allows Japan to normalize its mechanisms of national power at its
own rate, chiefly by increasing its military capabilities (New York Times, 1999).
Alliance tensions, manifested as Japanese insecurity and nationalism, will shape the
character of the partnership and impact Japan's military growth. The United States is
often forced to both goad Japan into adhering to the alliance and retard Japanese over-
exuberance (Economist, 1999 and Japanese Naval Attache, 1999). By properly
understanding the nuances of the US-Japan alliance, America can influence its
development, functioning, and the evolution of Japan's military.
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1. The Continued Existence of the Alliance
Though there are many issues where Japanese and American security concerns in
Asia diverge, there are still enough common strategic interests in the region that will
solidify their relationship (Saito, 1998). As the world's two most technologically
advanced and wealthiest democracies, both states desire physical and economic security
which are best maintained by stability in Asia and a continued majority share of the
region's net power. Though the nature and intensity of threat is asymmetrical and of
varying modes and degrees for Japan and the United States, the existence of the threat is
real (Walt, 1987 :44). Both states see China, the Koreas, and Russia as common threats
to their aspirations. (Kawano, 1998 :11) The competition for a controlling share of
power in Asia will only intensify and bring the two nations closer. World polarization
between China and Russia, which fear containment, and "the West," led by the United
States, will continually reinforce Japan's historic affiliation with the West and traditional
animosity with China and Russia (Stratfor GIU, 1999 and Walt, 1987 :33 and 153).
The magnitude, proximity, and historical enmity of the regional threat will cause
Japan to balance against it in alliance with the United States as it has in the past (Walt,
1987 : 153). Unlike China and Russia, Japan has nothing to fear from the United States'
benign brand of maritime power (Wirtz, 1998). It has endured the worst possible
consequences of an adversarial relationship with the US, conquest and occupation, and
found them to have been fairly inoffensive and beneficial (Olsen, 1999).
Japan also will retain its alliance with the US because it has proven a favorable
security strategy since 1945 and because there is no plausible alternative at present
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(Fukuyama and Oh, 1993 :46). Japan's alliance with America has been the most
successful in its history. It has allowed Japan to achieve nearly all of its national goals
and to conduct both its internal and external affairs with little risk to its national security
as no other arrangement has in the past (Defense of Japan, 1997). No other country is
financially or militarily powerful enough or has the political desire to replace the United
States in this relationship. Japan will follow evolutionary change in its security system
rather than revolutionary change that would risk disrupting this safety net.
The US-Japan alliance conforms to trends in Japan's modern alliances. To alter
this arrangement would be a radical shift in Japanese policy for which there is no catalyst
or precedent. Japan has a modern history of alignment with the world's hegemonic
powers in pursuit of its goals. For most of the period beginning in 1 868, Japan has
almost continually allied itself with one or more major powers: first with France then
Germany; then Britain in 1904, and later with all the Triple Entente allies until the 1920s,
with the Axis powers until 1945; and with the US during the Cold War (Green, 1998
:22). Each peacetime change of alliance partners was precipitated by radical shifts in
world and regional events causing Japan to seek greater security. First, Germany
supplanted France as the primary military power in Europe and thus a more successful
model for the infant Meiji State. Alliance with Britain offered a maritime, hegemonic
partnership and a check to French aid for Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. During the
First World War, Japan joined the Allies which allowed it to exploit a power vacuum in
Asia during the First World War. During the 1930s, Japan joined the Axis because of its
own economic collapse and abandonment by the United States during the 1930s. With
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the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is still the world hegemon and the best
guarantor of security. In the current US-Japan alliance, both parties seek to increase the
quality of an association that needs adjusting to post-Cold War imperatives. No new
international paradigms exist that would terminate Japan and America's relationship. A
radical shift in alliances, for no apparent reason, would cause alarm among Japan's
neighbors (Defense of Japan, 1997 :106). Only America's loss of power could
precipitate such a drastic change in Japanese thinking.
Thus, questions over the long-term continuance of the US-Japan alliance have
been in error. Problems between the two states have been seen as diminishing the
prospects for alliance survival. They should be seen, however, as growing pains within a
successful union. The following sections explore how obligations under the 1996 US-
Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines might cause Japan to increase its military
capabilities. They also depict that, rather than working to eliminate the alliance, stresses
between Japan and America could likely shape the extent and character of Japan's
military force construction.
2. The Alliance as a Source of Military Growth
The predominant dynamic between the US and Japan is Japanese insecurity.
Alliance insecurities will motivate Japan's creation of a power projection military force.
Japan suffers from an entrapment-versus-abandonment dilemma in its relationship with
the United States (Green, 1998 :22). In its efforts to maintain a claim to national
sovereignty and balance its international relations, Japan fears being drawn into
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detrimental political situations because of its obligations to the United States. At the
same time, Japan fears being either ignored or neglected by the US in diplomatic and
security issues. Much of its rearmament decisions may be seen as a reaction to this
predicament. Japanese defense policies swing from recalcitrance over fears of
entrapment to near militant fervor in an effort to draw attention to its vulnerable political
position in Asia and proximity to regional threats. (Green, 1998 :13) Japan may feel
compelled to gain greater military capabilities by its reactions to insecurities within the
alliance. As international condemnation of Japan eases and threats grow, Japan may opt
to gain more unilateral security by incrementally increasing its military power.
3. Japanese Insecurity and Nationalism
Two factors will impact Japan's alliance insecurities, and ultimately urge it
toward building a more capable military: the asymmetrical nature of the US-Japan
relationship, and Japanese nationalism. (Green, 1998 :13) These two factors also will
give Japan the leverage to rearm according to its own terms.
The asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Japan will give
Japan the leverage to pace the magnitude and type of military force to its self-interested
agenda. Japan is clearly the junior partner in the alliance and closest to the primary
threats to that alliance. America, with relative protection from overseas affairs provided
by distance, can make demands or place restraints on Japan that the latter may find more
expensive to follow rather than to violate. Japan's reluctance to meet US expectations
within the alliance is well known. This position has given Japan leverage in the alliance
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out of proportion to its apparent physical power within the relationship. This leverage
has been enhanced because Japan is able to manipulate politically the level of assistance
supplied to it by the United States through public opinion and recalcitrance. 23 America is
continually placed in the position of "begging" Japan to cooperate in regional and
domestic defense. (Walt, 1987 :44)
Japan may be able to dictate the pace of increasing its capabilities but it will
ultimately be forced to do so. Japan will face the task of fulfilling provisions of the
alliance and deflecting criticism for this. The alliance will provide an excuse to
overcome this opposition. Japan is gradually moving into compliance with the provisions
of the US-Japan defense cooperation guidelines which it signed under US pressure and
over Chinese and Russian protests. This obligation has enabled Japan to comply
progressively with the guidelines thereby staving off American impatience, domestic
opposition, and international criticism. Japan is able to use the alliance as a plausible
cover to increase its military capabilities as it has already done with the acquisition of
AWACS, air-to-air refueling capabilities, and major combatant ships. (New York Times,
1999)
Nationalism will continue to evolve into more than a basis for mercantile realism
within Japan's comprehensive security doctrine (Green, 1998 :13). If properly
manipulated by America, it could motivate Japan to create a more potent and capable
2:> The United States has been on the diplomatic defensive in Asia as it has fought to defend its position as
a unipolar hegemon. Except for Guam, the US is entirely dependent on host nation compliance for regional
support In the wake of America's loss of economic hegemony in Asia, and diplomatic failures such as the
Philippine base closures and Japanese public unrest over a large military' presence, the US has appeared
increasingly impotent (Yahuda. 1996). Many Asian states also question America's resolve to continue its
role in the region (Yahuda. 1996).
military force without creating negative side effects. Nationalism is a product of Japan's
insecurities. It is partially caused by Japan's entrapment and abandonment dilemma.
Professor Tadokoro Masayuki of the Japan Defense Academy, claims that Japan's
nationalism is suppressed. Its lack of military capabilities and its pacifist policies have
created a "legitimacy deficit." He believes it is dangerous, therefore, to keep the
Japanese mentally introspective. (Tadokoro in Drifte, 1998). The United States, by
allowing and even coaxing Japan into developing a "normal" state can do much to
subvert the potentially dangerous consequences of uncontrolled nationalism. But
America must be careful of pushing too hard. US pressure for Japan to assume a greater
share of defense burdens, recent criticism over Japan's financial performance, and
protectionist rhetoric from Congress and the US Trade Representative Office has served
to exacerbate Japan's feelings of abandonment. This pressure, criticism, and
protectionism inflame Japanese nationalist and anti-American sentiments (Funabashi,
1998). On 16 March 1999, outgoing Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Saito
Kunihiko, warned that a high level of criticism could re-ignite Japanese nationalist and
militarist sentiments. While this outcome is unlikely, it is significant that a Japanese
official used the term "militarism," the existence of which the government has denied, as
a veiled threat against America. (Stratfor GIU, 1999) Tokyo's recent election of an
ultra-nationalist mayor, Ishihara Shintaro, author of The Japan That Can Say No and
legislation to rid Tokyo of Yokota air base, is further proof that nationalism is on the rise.
Ignoring Japan in favor of China, a critical blunder of the Clinton administration, also
exacerbates Japanese insecurities (Funabashi, 1998). Ignoring Japan, legalistic
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approaches to the alliance relationship, and undue pressure will only result in negative
Japanese reactions. US foreign relation skills must become more nuanced to handle the
complex and delicate relationship with the Japanese.
4. Technonationalism and Nuclear Weapons
Japan's ability to construct nuclear weapons may wed it closer to the United
States and promote increased construction of conventional forces. Japan could only
defend itself unilaterally if it adopted nuclear weapons. Deployment considerations and
political will make this alternative to the US-Japan alliance problematic.
The possibility that Japan might adopt nuclear weapons is an extreme example of
technonationalism24 (Green, 1998 :13). Japan maintains the plutonium, the delivery
capability, and the knowledge to construct a nuclear weapon within six months
(Nakasone, 1999 and Young, 1978).25 This latent capability does not go unnoticed in
Asia. The density of Japan's population and industry, 70 percent of which lays between
Osaka and Tokyo, coupled with its scarce land area make it impossible for the country to
build or deploy a large enough land based nuclear weapon system to threaten an in-kind
retaliation vis-a-vis the PRC or Russia. (Nakasone, 1999 and Young, 1978) The only
24
"Technonationalism" is a component of Japanese nationalism. This pride in Japan's technical abilities,
which also stems from feelings of insecurity, motivates the state to indiginize certain sectors of weapons
and industrial production in an effort to preserve its sovereignty and prevent entrapment that might occur
by relying on US weapon sources.
25 Japan's H-II rocket can deliver a two metric ton payload into space (Japan Encyclopedia. 1993). Japan's
commercial light-water reactors produce plutonium with 60 percent Pu-239. This material, with
processing, could be rendered into weapons grade plutonium. (Imai. 1998)
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countries Japan could credibly threaten with a land-based nuclear force are North and
South Korea. Japan would have to build a sea-based launch capability to attain an in-
kind retaliation capability. It does not have the national will, available capital, or the
capabilities to do this. The assembly of one nuclear weapon would abrogate Japan's non-
proliferation pledges, remove a primary pretext for alliance with the US, and abruptly
reverse its longstanding diplomatic position on WMD sending alarms throughout Asia.
This would result in sever diplomatic problems. (Nakasone, 1999)
Japan's inability to possess nuclear weapons effectively may increase its
insecurities and motivate it to develop more extensive conventional forces and doctrine.
India and Pakistan's recent criticism of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty "clique"
divided the international community between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Japan's
diplomatic failures with India, Pakistan, and North Korea have classified it to many as an
international "have-not." (Funabashi, 1998) Loss of face equates to a loss of prestige for
Japan. It may compensate for this inequity with greater military capabilities and
normalization of the concept of military force.
The US-Japan security alliance will likely stand as Japan's source of vital national
security in a changing and uncertain world. In its ever-continuing search for greater
security, however, Japan will likely increase its conventional military capabilities. The
US must understand the nuances of the alliance's dynamics if it is to make it compliment
America's capabilities and policies. Too often, the US is tempted to view Japan as an
"Asian England" with the concomitant geopolitical characteristics implied in that
misconception. Unlike the US's European ally, Japan's insecurities must be ameliorated
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with skillful American leadership. Insecurity and nationalism are both a stimulus for and
a restraint on evolving Japanese military capabilities and concepts of force in their
national security policy. Manipulated properly, the United States can influence Japan's
national security processes and the quality of the alliance. Heavy-handedness, however,
could cause Japan to make decisions outside the bounds of logic and mutual benefit.
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HI. OBSTACLES TO NORMALIZATION
Japan must decide whether to eliminate Article 9 of its constitution as an obstacle
to its national security process or to continue to reinterpret it based on changing
requirements. The Article's role as an obstacle to freedom of action will only increase as
demographic challenges make Japan's security and economic prosperity more dependent
on the credible use of military force. 1 Dispassionate analysis reveals that Japan should
alter its constitution to reflect reality. Public opinion will dictate otherwise.
Two issues have reopened the debate on Article 9. The first, previously discussed
in Chapter L is the need for increased military security. The second is that the costs of
altering Article 9 have been reduced. In the post-Second-World-War era, Japan adopted
an ethos of minimum defense, pacifism, and a reactive foreign policy sensitive to
international criticism. This ethos was institutionalized over the course of fifty years
through the establishment of formal rules and structures of which Article 9 was the most
effective. Periodic Cold-War reformers in Japan discovered that the elite's entrenched
interests and the costs of altering institutions established by the system over the years
prevented alteration of the constitution. (Chai, 1997 :28) These transaction costs were
impediments to change. Destruction of these impediments now permits alteration or
elimination of Article 9.
See Chapter II for a discussion of those factors.
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A. TRANSACTION COSTS
Transaction costs are the products of vested interests and infrastructures created
by these interests. Much of Japan's government has been structured around a bullish
Japanese economy and a static security environment. (Chai, 1997 :31) The Persian Gulf
War, recession of Japan's economy, the DPRK's Taepodong missile launch, and Japan's
recent naval clash with DPRK ships have all contributed to the destruction of the old
economic and security paradigms built during the Cold War. With new paradigms come
new institutions and actors with new focal points and agendas to react to the new
requirements of the altered system. New requirements for security are bringing a
concomitant rise in the influence of the JDA and SDF and their minority of advocates. 2
With this comes a corresponding, relative loss ofpower by those who are dedicated to the
old paradigm. This principle has recently manifested itself in the unanimous support of
all major Japanese political factions for the increased use of the SDF abroad as each
political faction strives to remain relevant to the issues of the times (Stratfor GIU, 1999).
Before the two dramatic events which roused Japan from its Cold War stupor, political
focal points centered on making the old comprehensive security and crony capitalist
paradigm work in a changing environment. The new political focal points are the
increased use of military forces and the reinvigoration of the economy through reform. 3
2 The trend in the United States has been for the military and the Department of Defense to become
increasingly active in both foreign policy and diplomacy. Part of this is domestic, an executive
administration narrowly focussed on Europe. Part of this results from greater levels of conflict in the
unstable international environment. Military officers are seen as better equipped to handle the conflict
associated with diplomacy. To a lesser extent this is beginning to happen with Japan
3 The increase is incrementally small but relative to past opinions, large.
70
B. ELIMINATING ARTICLE 9
There are many reasons why Japan should eliminate Article 9 from its national
security policy. On first consideration, the decision would seem to be the logical
conclusion of a cost-benefit analysis. Article 9 is a hindrance to Japan's pursuit of its
national goals. In the past, Japan has used this constitutional constraint to preserve its
focus on economic primacy (ACCJJ, 1998 :14). The efficacy of economic primacy
disappeared with the recent economic crisis. Article 9 also is an obstacle to full UN
participation, and by inference, to a permanent seat on the Security Council and Japan's
preeminence in the international system. In 1993, then Secretary General Boutrus
Boutrus-Ghali stated:
My hope is that the government of Japan will be able to change the
constitution so that it will allow the Japanese forces to participate in
operations of peace enforcement.
The underlying reason for Article 9 also has disappeared. In 1946, a peaceful,
democratic Japan was merely an international desire without precedent or tradition to
insure its supremacy. Article 9 was the guarantor of that democracy. (Drifte, 1 999)
Today, Japan's establishment of democratic norms has supplanted this legalistic
guarantee. Article 9 is obsolete.
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C. REINTERPRETATION AND PUBLIC OPINION
If a constitutional conflict arises, Japan probably will choose to reinterpret Article
9 to suit its immediate needs rather than alter its constitution. There is no popular support
for changing it. Surveys taken in 1997 of more than 6300 voters by Nikkei Research,
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), and the Yomiuri Shimbun show that only 42
percent supported revising the constitution in any way. Article 9 was simply one issue
considered. (Roper Center, 1999) In addition, there is no precedent for a constitutional
convention in Japan (Olsen, 1985).
The Japanese are not likely to alter their constitution because altering any part of
it would be seen as altering their democracy as a whole. (Katzenstein and Okawara,
1993) Japan's democracy is different than the United States'. Because America was
founded on democracy, it has known no other system. Americans have a tactile, visceral
sense of democracy that few changes in outward conduct or laws could alter. The
United States is, therefore, flexible in its attitude toward adapting democracy to the needs
of the time. America invented it, or so we think. It is what we decide it is. Japan is static
in its understanding of democracy.
The link between the Japanese people's internal sense of constitutionalism and
government policy is unique among the world's democracies (Beer in Katzenstein and
Okawara, 1993 : 103). It is a linkage based on legalism rather than visceral emotion and
cultural attachment as in America. The Japanese have only experienced democracy for
50 years. It was superimposed on their society in 1946 rather than developed from the
cultural proclivities of the nation. They value it highly as a system that has provided
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social and economic benefits over the years but have no deep-seated cultural attachment
to it. Japan's national identity is not defined by a history of dedication to democratic
abstracts such as liberty orfreedom. No Japanese blood has been shed in defense of their
democratic ideals. It is emotionally inexpensive compared with the brand of democracy
practiced in the United States. On the contrary, Japan's blood was shed fighting those
who espoused it in the Second World War. Democracy, then, is a "black box"
represented by the Japanese constitution, the inner workings of which are a mystery. To
eliminate a piece of it would be to fundamentally alter the democracy as a whole.
(Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993)
Article 9 is one part of the "black box" that Japanese people understand and to
which they have a close attachment. It is the heart of their democracy. (Hayashi, 1999)
They are not likely to do away with it. Japanese brandish its ethos, pacifism, in an
attempt to distance themselves from national misdeeds during the Second World War.
As author Tetsuya Kataoka notes:
Article IX is to the Japanese constitution what the right of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness is to the American constitution: more
than mere written words on a piece of document (sic), it has become
the very essence of the Japanese regime or polity (In Katzenstein and
Okawara, 1993 :103).
Chalmers Johnson comments, "Most Japanese equate Article 9 of the constitution with
democracy itself; to alter one is to alter the other." (Johnson, 1997) Past attempts to alter
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. . .This much is certain; that he that commands the sea is at
great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as
he will. Whereas these, that be strongest by land, are many
times nevertheless in great straits.
—Francis Bacon
Chapter II demonstrated that Japan is being compelled to restore balance to its
national security policies by normalizing the use military force. The question then arises:
what form will this military force take? Japan will likely give emphasis to its naval
forces. This is not to say that Japan will do away with its land or air forces. On the
contrary, these branches would be necessary to support Japanese maritime power.
A. A MARITIME NATION
Japan is a maritime nation with corresponding maritime modalities (Funabashi,
1998). Captain AT. Mahan, in his book The Influence ofSea Power Upon History, lists
six characteristics of a sea power. 1 He asserts that the extent to which a nation possesses
these will determine its strength as a sea power and maritime nation. Japan possesses all
six to a great extent.
' These are: 1) Geographical Position - As an archipelago. Japan is directed toward the sea; 2) Physical
Conformation—Japan possesses a territorial configuration conducive to the maintenance of sea power; 3)
Extent of Territory—Japan is not overextended in its physical possessions; 4) Number of Population—
Japan has adequate population centers on its coast and adequate available population and technology to
maximize that population in maritime activities; 5) National Character—Japan has great aptitude for
commercial pursuits and an export economy; 6) Character of the Government— Japan* s government
assists trade but derives its impetus and power from its people. (Mahan, 1894 .29-89)
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As a maritime nation, Japan has challenges that are best met with maritime
solutions. Naval power benefits Japan because:
a. It is least disruptive to the region.
b. It is the best means to achieve Japan's national goals.
c. It is least volatile to domestic political considerations.
d. It can most effectively defend Japan from its external threats.
e. It is best suited to the political requirements of Japan's evolving economy.
f It is necessary to fulfill the requirements of Japan's alliance with the United
States.
g. It can best maximize Japan's national talents while contributing most to its
economy in return.
These are detailed in the following sections.
B. THE UTILITY OF MARITIME FORCES
1. The Least Disruptive
If we accept that internal and external factors will compel Japan to increase its
military force projection capabilities, then it would make sense for Japan to do this in a
way that minimizes the anxieties of its Asian neighbors who are wary of any Japanese
military power. Maritime forces are unobtrusive and the least disruptive to Japan's
Asian neighbors. They will draw the least notice from other nations. (Bracken, 1998)
International opinion is critical for Japan's global acceptance and its domestic consensus.
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Responsibly maintaining naval forces is a way for Japan to demonstrate its
trustworthiness to the world and repair the regional distrust formed during the Second
World War. Unlike continental forces sent abroad, a navy comes with its own readily
perceivable means of withdrawal (Wirtz, 1999). Ships can be pulled out to sea where
they are out of sight but still available to support developing contingencies. (Bracken,
1998) Aircraft must either depart areas of operations after delivering their troops, making
hasty extraction impossible, or sit vulnerably in airports where they are visible reminders
of a nation's presence.
2. An Aid to National Goals
Maritime forces are the best means to achieve Japan's national goals. By
contributing naval forces to UN operations, Japan could aid its bid for a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council. One of the primary obstacles to obtaining this seat has been
Japan's reluctance to make a military contribution to UN operations beyond its limited
peacekeeping and observation roles (Drifte, 1998 :94). Maritime contributions would
enable Japan to contribute to UN operations and fulfill its goal of having a "normal
nation" while maintaining a significantly reduced regional and world footprint. With a
dominant Maritime Self-Defense Force, and a correspondingly limited Ground Self-
Defense Force (JGSDF,) Japan could only be expected to provide contributions
commensurate with its capabilities and strengths. Instead of limited half-measures, such
as global medical teams that gain little international credibility, Japan could provide sea-
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based logistic support, naval security, and anti-air defense for multi-lateral operations.
This would permit Japan to contribute combat forces with honor and minimum presence.
3. Domestic Politics: Japan's Critical Vulnerability
Maritime forces are the least disruptive to domestic politics. Japan's aversion to
casualties will cause it to seek technological solutions in the use of military force.
Commitment of maritime forces, rather than air units or ground troops, reduces the
possibility of casualties, and the resultant negative popular resistance to overseas military
engagements. The Japanese government and the SDF will continue to be vulnerable to
public opinion in any future military operation. (Bracken, 1998) It would pay political
dividends for Japan to reduce its ground footprint to the absolute minimum possible. Air
facilities are often the focus of violence in troubled states. Static ground forces are
extremely vulnerable to terrorist actions or even conventional targeting as America has
discovered in the Middle East. Casualties are Japan's greatest vulnerability, more so
than other countries given its pacifist political climate. The death of two Japanese
servicemen in the 1993 Cambodia peacekeeping operation caused intense public outcry
and pressure to terminate such operations. Almost half of all Japanese polled after the
event called for the force's withdrawal until one of the serviceman's fathers pleaded for
national support. (FEER, 1993) The small, volatile factions likely to be encountered in
an OOTW environment seek disproportionate political gains through violent ground
actions against first world critical vulnerabilities such as an intolerance for casualties.
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Japan's political vulnerability could make it a liability in any multi-national operation. It
would likely be targeted by terrorists or insurgents among any coalition forces to exploit
this vulnerability (Olsen, 1999). Antagonists in OOTW scenarios will not likely present
a sophisticated naval or air threat to coalition maritime forces. The use of maritime
forces lessens the chance that Japanese combatants would come into direct contact with
belligerents and messy ground actions.
4. Threat Response
Japan's military security threats are maritime in nature. It is no surprise that
Japan's three largest military confrontations since the Second World War have involved
naval forces.
3
Clearly, defense against North Korean infiltrators, Russian military
resurgence, and Chinese hegemony, along with its ability to act in any of its island
disputes, is largely a function of Japanese naval power.
Japan can best defend against its survival level threats with sea power. At
present, these are North Korea's ballistic missile program and the Chinese and Russian
nuclear missile arsenals. While Japan's ultimate defense is the US nuclear umbrella, it
seeks a means to defeat these threats unilaterally, with a minimum of force, rather than
solely relying on in-kind retaliation. Nations will strive to achieve security, one way or
another. Ultimately, the Japanese will do this either through JDA Director General
2
Terrorist attacks on the Marine barracks at Beirut Airport (1983) and the Air Force's Khobar Towers
(1996). along with the Iraqi SCUD missile attack on the US Army barracks in Bahrain (1991). are
reminders of the dangers of static land presence and the benefits of sea based power.
3 1957—Interception of and firing on a Soviet ship. 1996—Dispatch of Maritime Safety Agency ship over
Taiwanese student occupation of an island of the Senkakus; 1996—Interception of and firing on North
Korean ships violating Japanese waters.
79
Nukaga Fukushiro's "first strike" option (possible, but remote) or through a missile
defense system (Stratfor, 29 Nov 98).
Current TMD aspirations reside in the development of a Navy Area and Theater
Wide (NTW) missile defense system in conjunction with the United States. As a
strategic asset, a sea-based TMD system will likely stimulate a greater Japanese focus on
sea power and production of additional assets to protect this valuable system. Japan
plans to augment its interim, ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability Three (PAC 3)
with the Navy system deployed on its fleet of Aegis destroyers. This sea-based system is
preferred over land-based systems due to a warship's strategic and tactical mobility
(Truver, 1998 :39). Japan's advanced Aegis fleet air defense system, with minor
improvements, already contains the launchers, sensors, and command-and-control
mechanisms needed for an effective TMD system (Gaffhey, 1998 :73).
Russia and China have denounced Japan's adoption of a sea-based TMD system.
China fears containment and transfer of the system to Taiwan in the event the PRC
decides to reunite the country by force. Opinion sensitive Japan has not hesitated on this
issue, however. This issue serves to illustrate that Japan can be decisive in its pursuit of
national security when it believes its survival interests are threatened.
C. FORCE SHAPING FACTORS
Japan's economic system, its developmental trends, and the country's increased
level of cooperation with US forces will give impetus to further development of its
maritime capabilities. These factors have not only reinforced the importance of sea-lane
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control, but have created a requirement for Japan to conduct amphibious operations to
support NEOs and effect logistic support to American forces. Japan's current capabilities
are insufficient to fulfill these tasks. The US-Japan security agreement also provides
parameters that will assist Japan in defining the size and capability limits of its maritime
forces. They have confirmed Japan's status as a guerre de course naval power.
1. Amphibious Requirements of a Maritime Economy
Maritime forces are best suited to fulfill the political requirements of Japan's
evolving economy. Over-committed US forces in Asia coupled with post-Cold War
instability and change of perceived threat has prompted Japan to reshape Maritime Self-
Defense Force for control of sea lines of communication and OOTW. The reshaping
effort has required a greater emphasis on naval presence, amphibious capability, and open
ocean patrolling rather than the JMSDF's traditional emphasis on anti-submarine and
anti-mine warfare in close proximity of the Japanese archipelago. (JDA, 1998) This is
reflected by Japan's desire to build Aegis class ships and updated amphibious vessels
(Naval Attache, 1999) This change in emphasis is not surprising given that Japan's
economy is wholly dependant on maritime trade and supply.
Japan's economic trends also are giving impetus for a limited forced-entry,
amphibious capability. Japan's evolution toward a headquarters economy coupled with
its desire to retain the means of overseas production has created an increased Japanese
presence overseas. This presence is compelling Japan to create the capability to conduct
NEOs. (Ezrati, 1997) American experience has demonstrated that only amphibious
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forces possessing platforms with multiple, forced entry capabilities are sufficient to
execute these operations.
Japan will not always be able to ensure the safety of its citizens by ordering them
home on chartered planes as they do now. Many nationals living overseas feel compelled
to stay in collapsing countries to protect their interest, often until it is too late.
Intelligence sometimes fails to predict catastrophic, political upheavals far enough in
advance to allow orderly evacuations. Commercial airports are usually the first facilities
seized or destroyed in political upheavals. Japan has been reluctant to focus on NEOs in
the past. Recently passed legislation permitting NEOs gives emphasis to this
requirement, however. Japan's procurement of the controversial Osumi class amphibious
ship is also tacit acknowledgement of the need for a greater amphibious capability. 4
Mere possession of amphibious ships does not enable Japan to conduct NEOs.
Japan will have to modernize its doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for
conducting amphibious operations, the most difficult of all military maneuvers.
Currently, the Japanese are loath to even use the word "amphibious" believing this
connotes aggressive intentions (Japanese Naval Attache, 1999). Japan must set its
political sensitivities aside and confront the fact that any naval operation involving a
demonstration, raid, assault, or withdrawal to or from land is an amphibious operation.
Japan, likewise, cannot avoid proper planning and procuring equipment for these
operations. Amphibious operations require adequate ground forces, weapons systems,
and transportation assets for security and for operations at sea and ashore. They also
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require greater cooperation between ground and naval forces as the United States Marine
Corps (USMC) can attest. One of the Japanese military's greatest weaknesses is the lack
of recent experience on which to base its training and doctrine (Alexander, 1993).
Japan's military could gain valuable insights for amphibious operations from a closer
working relationship with the USMC and Navy.
2. Maritime Alliance
A maritime force is necessary to fulfill the requirements of Japan's alliance with
the United States. The US-Japan security alliance is an alliance of two maritime nations
that requires maritime forces to fulfill its provisions. This alliance will increase Japan's
maritime focus. It will help determine the capabilities that Japan will create by
specifying a division of labor between the US and Japan for maritime operations.
Since 1997, the US has been pressuring Japan to do more both militarily and
economically, for stability in Asia (Economist, 1999). In the recent guidelines for US-
Japan defense cooperation, Japan responded to this pressure by agreeing to cooperate
with US forces in situations surrounding Japan (JDA Guidelines, 1999). Although Japan
insists that its assistance will be determined by situation rather than by geography, Japan
will probably concentrate on its 1000 mile zone of operations agreed to in earlier
discussions (Economist, 1999 :24). A look at a map will confirm that operations in this
area will be predominantly maritime. Japan's commitment to assisting the US sounds
ambiguous. The Japanese, however, have little real choice. Failure to support a US
4 The JDA has stated that the JDS Osumi could play a part in international disaster relief operations
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engagement in Asia, in the wake of Japan's performance in the 1991 Gulf War, could be
diplomatically disastrous, and jeopardize the alliance. (Kawano, 1998).
The new guidelines could require Japan to increase its amphibious and sea-borne
logistic capabilities. Japan may find it necessary to increase its amphibious cargo and
underway replenishment vessels to fulfill roles expected by the United States. Although
much of the support Japan would give to the US would be to forces stationed in Japan
proper, an extended conflict, say in Taiwan or Korea, would likely involve Japanese
maritime resupply. Currently, Japan has only two, at-sea refueling ships which are
inadequate for extended operations (Sakoda, 1999).
Japan's naval power is relegated to a guerre de course role. It is capable of
handling limited military actions and support rather than large engagements spanning the
spectrum of naval operations. Large engagements are the realm of a fleet navy. Japan
maintained a sophisticated fleet navy until 1945. It found, however, that it could not
sustain it due to Japan's limited resources. Japan has conveniently left the construction
of such an expensive and politically volatile naval force to the US. (JDA Guidelines,
1999) Roles are also allocated to each country based on its capabilities. It has, so far,
been content to achieve the protection benefits from America's fleet Navy by way of
alliance.
The nature of the US-Japan alliance will help define the limits of Japanese naval
power. Japan, left alone to define the size and capabilities of its naval forces, would
exceed that with which the United States, and the world, is comfortable. The US acts as
(Bristow. 1998)
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the "cap in the bottle," preventing extensive Japanese naval growth by reducing the need
for fleet naval forces.
5
Without the restraint of the alliance, Japan would construct larger
naval assets such as aircraft carriers or amphibious assault ships. Even with the benefits
of alliance, the US has had to use its dominant position to dissuade Japan from building
aircraft-carrying ships. Recently, Japan sought both greater naval aviation capabilities
and larger fleet-type ships. The US rejected both as too volatile for regional stability.
(Japanese Naval Attache, 1999) Rising nationalism and North Korean military
adventurism may make restraining Japan a more difficult task in the future.
D. THE RETURN OF A JAPANESE FLEET FORCE?
Japan's introduction of the Osumi class of ships could be the beginning of fleet-
type assets for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The configuration of the JDS
Osumi, which Japan claims is an LST, is closer to that of the Wasp class. Landing Helo
Dock (LHD) than a traditional LST. It could have a larger operating and design potential
than what the JDA indicates. The front of the Osumi 's flight deck is truncated, with the
bow jutting out another 157.5 feet (Janes, 1999). The Osumi and her sister ships could be
transformed into amphibious assault ships with a fixed wing capability. (Bristow, 1998)
A 200 foot long, bow ramp could easily be added to the ship increasing its flight-deck
length to over 600 feet, sufficient to launch and recover Vertical/Short Take Off and
Landing (VSTOL) aircraft such as the Harrier (Bristow, 1998 :80). At the very least, the
Osumi will allow the JMSDF to hone its skills in flight deck operations and perfect
This phrase is attributed to General Stackpole. USMC.
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carrier and amphibious ship component designs in preparation for more capable ships in
the future.
Due to the growth of other Asian navies, the United States will find it difficult to
mollify Japan's naval aspirations. Thailand has set a precedent which might allow, or
compel, Japan to acquire more capable naval assets. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has
acquired the Spanish-built aircraft carrier, the RTN Chakkrinareubet, giving it East
Asia's only sea-based air power.
6
At 11,500 tons, it outclasses the Osumi. (Cole, 1997)
Thailand's increasing ties to China could cause alarm (Olsen, 1999 and Cole, 1997).
China has been seeking an aircraft carrier for its fleet but is thought to lack the necessary
engineering skills to completely design one from the keel up (Cole, 1997). Thailand
could conceivably give China access to one for reverse engineering. These threats would
justify Japan's pursuance of greater capabilities to retain its leading position in Asia's
naval race (Klare, 1997).
E. NATIONAL EFFICIENCY
1. Matching National Capabilities to Force Construction
Emphasizing the primacy of its maritime forces will permit Japan to maximize its
national resources in pursuit of a credible and effective military. The law of comparative
advantage dictates that a country must maximize its resources or suffer disadvantages in
6
India, a South Asian state, also possesses an aircraft carrier.
' Thailand has purchased significant quantities of Chinese weapons including warships and anti-ship
missiles. Frigates imported from China were so poorly constructed that they required significant amounts
of extra work before they could be declared operationally fit. (Cole, 1997)
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military effectiveness and economic efficiency. States must construct military forces that
can best be formed and sustained by their national modality. The shape a country's
military takes must be suited to its production base, economy, talents, and national
character. The form must be compatible with the means.
The need for compatibility dictates that a continental power cannot become an
effective maritime power and a maritime power cannot become an effective continental
power. The consequences of trying to do so are usually economic degradation and
defeat. Two examples of this are Imperial Germany's failed bid for naval supremacy as a
continental power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and maritime
Japan's inability to subdue China from 1931 to 1945. States which correctly match the
form of their military power to their national modality have much greater opportunities
for effectiveness.
A shift to a predominantly maritime oriented military is the most efficient use of
Japan's national resources while contributing most to its economy in return. As the cost
of labor is rising due to Japan's evolving economy and shifting demographics, the
country is seeking to construct a technological solution to its need for armed forces (JDA,
1999). Japan will likely see the ship as the technology best suited to carry out its military
needs. Overall, naval forces are the most efficient use of Japan's industrial capabilities,




The cost and availability of personnel in Japan could be play a role in the
country's shift to a more technologically dependent, maritime oriented military. Naval
forces are usually the least manpower intensive. People generally cost more than
machines. The JDA's highest expenditures are for personnel. Japan's 1997 defense
budget was $41.2 billion of which 43 percent were personnel costs (Defense of Japan,
1998). Compare this to the United States which spends only about 28 percent annually
on manpower (Department of Defense, 1999). Currently, the JMSDF maintains the most
powerful Asian naval force with only 15.5 percent of all personnel in Japan's armed
forces, including reserves, while the Ground Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense
Force (JASDF) have 68.5 and 16.0 percent respectively (JDA, 1998). It takes fewer
people, and is therefore cheaper, to man a warship than a regiment or an air group.
A shortage of personnel, for social, economic, and demographic reasons, is
already affecting the Self-Defense Forces. They will have an even more difficult time
attracting qualified recruits in the future without significantly increasing costly benefits.
The JGSDF has only been able to fill 80 percent of its manpower structure for several
years (Japanese Naval Attache, 1999). By 2010, male military manpower availability
could drop by as much as 30 percent if current trends continue (Ezrati, 1997; CIA, 1998;
and Defense of Japan, 1998). In contention with cultural norms, the SDF has recruited
more women into its ranks raising the total to about 4.2 percent of all personnel.
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3. Japan's Engineering Talents and Deficiencies
Japan is able to produce the weapons of the JMSDF better than it can complex
weapons systems in either the JASDF or JGSDF. For all of Japan's technical skills, its
military weapons designers and engineers lack the ability to integrate sub-systems into
complex weapons. Japanese excellence in component subsystem design, however, makes
warship production a much more attainable goal (Alexander, 1993 :51). The conceptual
development of military weapons systems requires a combination of technical acumen
and experienced military judgement (Alexander, 1993 :31). Japan suffers from a lack of
modern combat experience from which to develop weapon design parameters. A country
needs its own operational parameters if its engineers are to ingrain an effective design
process into their own military industrial thinking. Having relied on American designed
weapons for decades, Japan lacks this cognition as well as previous design experience
with which to improve its current procedures. This flaw is partially the result of Japan's
modern design traditions. Instead of seeking to produce militarily effective weapon
systems, their primary goal has been to acquire foreign technologies for transfer to
Japan's civilian industries. Japan has produced many effective weapons. Effectiveness,
however, was a byproduct of their design process rather than its primary goal.
(Alexander, 1993)
Failure to indiginize a design process has prevented Japanese industry from
conducting effective systems engineering. Attempts at designing weapons systems have
resulted in a host of technologies "cobbled" together, building-block style, rather than a
symbiotic combination of sub-systems which smoothly function together. (Alexander,
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1993 .31) The results of these deficiencies are similar to those produced from Soviet-
style reverse engineering. Producers know the how but do not know the why that enables
them to create and innovate.
The most recent example of this is the creation of Japan's F-2 fighter. Originally,
the Japanese planned to indigenously develop and produce the aircraft. Japan's inability
to integrate sub-systems resulted in a heavy reliance on the United States for design.
About 40 percent of the fighter is US built (Klare, 1997). Ships, in contrast to aircraft,
have less tightly integrated subsystems and are therefore more conducive to building-
block design and construction.
Japan can also produce ships cheaper than other weapon systems of comparable
military efficacy. As a maritime nation, Japan's design talents and national industry
excel in ship design and construction. The Japanese build almost half of the world's
gross tonnage in a given year (Keidanren, 1998). Japan can produce ship hulls cheaper
than the US or Britain due to an economy of scale and the more developed production
techniques of a well established civilian industry, something that does not exist for other
Japanese weapon systems (Drifte, 1986 and Alexander, 1997).
Japan's laws prohibiting weapon exports make it impossible to create an economy
of scale for most of its weapon systems. 9 Ships, however, have more dual use
components than other types of weapon systems. For example, Japan's newest tank, the
8
In 1998, Japan completed 10,049 thousand tons. World production was 24,187 thousand tons.
(Keidanren, 1998)
9 Japan expressed interest in producing small aircraft for the Asian market in 1996 . An international market
for their aircraft might enable the Japanese to create an economy of scale for indigenous fighter production
similar to its ship industry. The failure of its YS-1 1 aircraft in the 1960s, the dominance of Boeing and
90
Type 90, cost almost three times that of America's more advanced M-l Abrams
(Alexander, 1997). 10 Japan is also in the habit of licensing many of its ship subsystems
from foreign manufacturers, a practice that saves the country up to three times the cost of
indigenous production (Drifte, 1986).
Airbus (60 and 40 percent of the total market respectively.) and Japans economic downturn are all
discouraging factors.




Many factors are forcing Japan toward a change in its military capabilities and its
conception of the use of military force in its national security doctrine. These forces,
which emanate from economics, military threats, and national insecurities, are fostered by-
changes in the international system brought about by the end of the Cold War. Japan's
reaction to those changes will decide the role of military forces in its national policies.
The Japanese desire to remain constant in a changing world. They would like to
maintain their pacifist ethos, current national security mechanisms, and the primacy of
economics in their Comprehensive Security doctrine. Japan has a political hierarchy of
needs that may ultimately dictate its policies and actions. 1 Japanese attachment to their
national goals established in 1868, particularly their desire for international prestige,
makes it impossible for its citizens and politicians to remain rigid in an ever changing
international security environment.
A. AN INEVITABLE MARITIME POWER
Japan will likely evolve toward great power status. To attain this status and their
other national goals, the Japanese will probably have to adopt a complete range of
sources for their national power, including military force. The Japanese must ensure their
protection from current and potential enemies, such as North Korea and China. They
must ensure their economic livelihood, made complicated by Japan's lack of resources
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and an evolving economy. Stability in Asia is crucial to these objectives. The Japanese
have defined their national goals, and the means to achieve them, within the norms of the
international system. They must garner a share of power from this system by operating
according to that system's rules. That system dictates that military power is important.
Japan can "borrow" some of this power from the United States via the alliance. It must
contribute increasing quantities of its own power to that alliance as the partnership
evolves. It is wedded to the US-Japan security agreement and the United Nations. Both
commitments require a measure of might.
If Japan refuses to acknowledge the evolving norms of this system, as North
Korea has, it may be punished by that system. Signs that Japan's pacifist methodologies
based on the primacy of economics are invalid in the post-Cold War world have already
materialized. Japan has been punished by financial crisis, increasing direct threats from
North Korea, and its inability to prevent nuclear proliferation in Asia through financial
aid. Japan's diplomacy is limited by its lack of a range of national power sources,
including military force, in its policies. (Funabashi, 1998) In 1998, former Prime
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro observed:
The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan seemed to leave the
Japanese feeling powerless. Even our political leaders lacked a clear
foundation or position on which to base their response on behalf of
nonnuclear Japan (Nakasone, 1998).
Abraham Maslow argued that every person has a hierarchy of needs that must be satisfied. These ranged
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An increased dedication to the US-Japan security agreement is an
acknowledgement of the validity of force in national security policy. We might even
view official adoption of the Hinomaru, the Japanese flag, and Ministry of Education
requirements that all Japanese students pay deference to it as a signal of a realist
awakening in Japan. In the past, the Japanese government refused to give official
recognition to the de facto national emblem on the grounds that it was a symbol of pre-
Second World War militarism, indoctrination, and emperor worship (USA Today, 1999).
Acceptance of the flag is not a return to militarism. It is a sign that Japanese are
increasingly viewing themselves and their country as a sovereign state governed by the
norms that apply to all other states.
Japan's need for greater military capabilities is manifesting itself in increased
maritime forces. Its restructuring efforts and weapon procurements have begun a
building process that will result in a technologically advanced, maritime force. For the
foreseeable future, it will be a complement to the US fleet. Coupled with its increased
satellite and aerial refueling capabilities, Japan will possess a greater power projection
force in the future. To focus on any other type of force would be to ignore Japan's
technical capabilities and national resources as a maritime state.
B. INTELLIGENT HANDLING OF THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP
Japan will follow international norms on the restraint of military forces as well as
for the growth of its military capabilities (Carpenter, 1995). By all expectations, it will
from basic psychological requirements to food shelter, and medicine (Maslow. 1999). I argue that states
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act as a cautious realist rather than as a rampaging militarist or feint-hearted pacifist
(Funabashi, 1998). Japanese development of military capabilities and incorporation of
force into their policy doctrine will be a slow and incremental process typical of a
democracy. Japan's national ethos, constitution, unique history, and international opinion
will slow its development and give it a surreptitious character, often mistaken as
connivance by Westerners. This dynamic may change as Japanese citizens with direct
war experiences recede from positions of influence.
Japan's rate of military growth, size, and capabilities will depend on how the
United States manages the alliance relationship. America must understand Japan's
unique position in history and the Asian region. The US is dealing with Japan from a
position of political, economic, and psychological superiority. America's influence with
Japan is tied to its ability to address Japanese insecurities to their satisfaction.
have a hierarchy of political needs that must conform to the construct of their national ethos and modality.
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